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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS ON 
SPECIAL LAWS 
JUSTIN R. LONG* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since the nineteenth century, most states have had constitutional clauses 
prohibiting “special laws.”  These clauses were ratified to protect the people of each 
state from domination by narrow economic elites, who would use their economic 
power to win grants of privilege from the state legislatures.  To fight the corrupt 
favors garnered by private interests in this way, state constitutional drafters wrote 
clauses requiring their legislatures to pass only “general laws” that would apply 
equally to all members of the regulated class.  For a brief period, these clauses were 
enforced in the courts—but more to protect economic elites than the democratic 
prerogatives of common people.  
The problem of capture of the political process by economic elites and its 
conversion to a spoils system for their own gain remains a threat to American 
democracy, particularly for state governments.  By the mid-twentieth century, 
however, courts began to stop enforcing these clauses.  Today, most courts 
interpreting their special laws clauses apply rational-basis review modeled on federal 
equal protection doctrine.  Sometimes, these courts will hold explicitly that their 
special laws prohibitions are equivalent in meaning to federal equal protection.  
Under that doctrine, grounded in the federal Fourteenth Amendment’s prevailing 
concern for racial equality, economic legislation receives only perfunctory review in 
court.  By applying federal doctrine, state courts have essentially read special laws 
prohibitions out of state constitutions. 
The dead-letter treatment of these state constitutional clauses in conformity with 
federal practice poses a challenge to the leading theories of state constitutional 
interpretation, all of which depend to varying degrees on the possibility of legal 
pluralism within the federalist framework.  In this Article, I examine how state 
popular movements to restrain their legislatures became ignored by their courts.  I 
suggest that current state constitutional theories are undermined by this judicial 
practice.  Those theories justify and legitimize state constitutional interpretation by 
reference to the capacity of state courts to diverge from federal tropes of analysis 
when the people so command through their state constitutions.  With special laws 
prohibitions, this process failed, and perhaps inevitably so. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, James Gardner described the state of state constitutionalism, 
and the view was bleak.1  As illustrated by its various critiques from Alaskans,2 
Oregonians,3 and their Romantic Subnationalist4 compatriots, The Failed Discourse 
                                                            
 1 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 761 (1992). 
 2 See Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner: Alaska’s 
Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) 
(attempting “an Alaskan rebuttal” of The Failed Discourse). 
 3 See David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
274, 276 (1992) (proposing Oregon jurisprudence as proof of the richness of state 
constitutional discourse). 
 4 “Romantic Subnationalism” is Professor Gardner’s term for the American state 
equivalent of nineteenth-century notions of peoplehood.  In this usage, Romantic nationalism 
was the view that different nations were imbued with inherent traits, evident in their history, 
laws, social practices, and artistic culture, which together formed the sole legitimate basis for 
a national identity.  See generally Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 
715, 740–741 (2011) (describing the romantic view of the German “Volk” as the basis for 
nationhood founded on ethnicity and common culture).  Romantic Subnationalism, then, is the 
view that each American state has a culturally unique “people” who inhabit it and by their 
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of State Constitutionalism provoked deep questions about the capacity of these 
documents (and their judicial interpreters) to sustain the sort of rich constitutional 
culture purportedly necessary to the preservation of important rights.  Now, with the 
twenty-first century well under way, any serious analysis of remedies available in 
court under state constitutions must also account for the courts’ ongoing discursive 
poverty.  Through a detailed exploration of state prohibitions on “special laws,” this 
Article seeks to describe how state high courts still have not developed5 independent 
constitutional discourse, even where every conventional interpretive tool would 
suggest that they should.  This ongoing failure weakens both leading schools of state 
constitutional theory, positivism and universalism, and has stark implications for 
populist efforts at law reform through state constitutional litigation. 
State constitutional “special laws” clauses are express prohibitions on legislation 
that would provide public benefit to private parties, such as earmarks.  Although 
historically distinct from “takings” clauses, special laws prohibitions effectively 
mirror the “public purpose” requirement of takings clauses.  Just as constitutional 
texts prohibit states from taking private property without a public purpose, special  
laws clauses prohibit states from giving public property without a public purpose.  
State constitutional prohibitions on “special” laws currently appear, in various forms, 
in the vast majority of state constitutions.6   
The special laws clauses’ focus on protecting the public from its nominally 
representative legislatures reflects a deep concern for legislative “capture,” what 
Samuel Isaacharoff has termed “clientelism”—“a patron-client relationship in which 
political support (votes, attendance at rallies, money) is exchanged for privileged 
                                                                                                                                            
innate common values imbue the state with normative legitimacy.  No major state 
constitutionalists today are committed to a defense of Romantic Subnationalism, although 
judicial opinions sometimes still reflect that worldview. 
 5 The question of responsibility for the underdevelopment of state constitutional law 
typically tracks the following circle of blame: courts blame the bar for not pressing fresh 
arguments; the bar blames law schools for not teaching state constitutional cases; and law 
schools blame courts for not authoring teachable opinions.  Because appellate courts are 
usually quick to dismiss arguments that were never presented by counsel, I treat the state 
constitutional decisions below as if the advocates had raised the appropriate arguments at least 
sufficiently to permit the court to rule on that basis, even though I lack empirical confirmation 
that this was so. 
 6 See ALA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 104-111; ALASKA CONST. ART. II, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 19; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3, amend. 14; art. V, § 25; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16; COLO. CONST. 
art. V, § 25; FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 10, 11; GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV; HAW. CONST. art 
I, § 21; IDA. CONST. art. III, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13; IND. CONST. art. IV, §§ 22, 23; IOWA 
CONST. art. I, § 6, ART. III, §§ 30, 31; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 17; KY. CONST. §§ 3, 59, 60; LA. 
CONST. art. III, § 12; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13; MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; MASS. CONST. pt. 
I, art. VI, amend. art. LXII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 29, 30; MINN. CONST. art XII, §§ 1, 2; 
MISS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 87-90; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 39-42; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 12; NEB. 
CONST. art. III, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. IV, §§ 20, 21; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 9; N.M. 
CONST. art. IV, §§ 24, 26; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32, art. II, § 24; N.D. 
CONST. art. I, § 21, art. IV, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2, art. II, § 26; OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 46, 
51, 59; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 20, 23; PA. CONST. art. I, § 17, art. III, § 32; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 
11; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 34; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23, art. VI, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3, art. III, § 56; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26; VA. CONST. art. I, § 4, art. IV, §§ 
14, 15; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 12, art. II, § 28; W.VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39; WIS. CONST. art. 
IV, § 31; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27. 
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access to public goods.”7  Nineteenth-century constitution-drafters frequently 
adopted a belt-and-suspenders approach to prohibiting the effects of this type of 
corruption, ratifying redundant clauses that both prohibited special laws where 
general laws could be enacted and prohibited special laws in specific subject areas;8 
some state constitutions even explicitly require the judiciary to determine whether a 
general law could have been made applicable.  Yet, as they have for a long time,9 
state high courts typically (although not universally) interpret these clauses as 
offering protection equivalent to the federal Equal Protection Clause. As a result, 
these courts adopt deferential stances toward their legislatures and skeptical stances 
toward rights claimants, even where the textual support for the claim is strong, one 
side seems to be an economic elite, and the legislature’s action appears 
countermajoritarian. 
This interpretive approach calls for explanation.  Why would state high courts 
decline to enforce special laws prohibitions?  While rationales to support 
enforcement may seem persuasive, even courts that do intermittently enforce the 
special laws prohibitions have been largely incapable of articulating a coherent 
standard of enforcement that would permit predictability in this area for legislators 
and the public. 
Ultimately, there seems to be no hint in existing caselaw or trends that state high 
courts might start to accept a more activist inquiry toward special laws.  This, in 
turn, presents a challenge to the leading theories of state constitutionalism.  I group 
these theories into three schools of thought: constitutional positivists, exemplified by 
scholars like Professors Robert Williams and Helen Hershkoff; constitutional 
universalists, including Professors Robert Cover and James Gardner and Dean 
Robert Schapiro; and constitutional pragmatists, including Dean Daniel Rodriguez 
and Professor Jim Rossi.  
The lack of judicial enforcement of the special laws prohibitions poses a problem 
for the positivists because they believe the courts should center their interpretation of 
the state constitution on each unique constitution itself (whether text or structure), 
but these clauses contain such deep incoherency that they are barely amenable to 
application.  In contrast to standard equal protection doctrine, where courts will 
invalidate legislation motivated by a pernicious purpose, “special” legislation might 
have won support for some entirely rational public purposes apart from its 
disproportionate advantage to private parties.  What is a positivist to do if the people 
put unintelligible clauses into their constitutions?   
The universalists face an even bigger problem, because they believe that state 
constitutions are a forum for debate about values in a community broader than the 
state.  For that forum to work as a site that makes values contestation possible, state 
constitutional meaning must be capable of diverging from the broader community’s 
conventional wisdom.  State constitutions, in this view, are like river eddies that can 
support habitats that differ from the body of the stream while still receiving from and 
contributing to it.  But non-enforcement of the unusual areas of state constitutional 
law where the constitutions do diverge from federal practice washes away these 
                                                            
 7 Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010). 
 8 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 278 (2009). 
 9 See Robert F. Williams, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: Equality 
Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1985) (detailing the 
“misunderstanding and underdevelopment” of state constitutional equality principles). 
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productive eddies.  For example, Professor James Gardner’s theory of interactive 
federalism depends on the citizens of each state adjusting their state constitutional 
arrangements to reflect their relative trust in their state and federal governments.  If 
the people of each state cannot effectively disempower their state legislature through 
special laws prohibitions, then state constitutional jurisprudence cannot accomplish 
the democratic purposes the theory assigns to it.   
In Part II, I describe the landscape of contemporary special laws jurisprudence 
and review the arguments for and against judicial enforcement of these clauses, 
concluding that meaningful interpretation might never be possible.  In Part III, I 
describe the leading current state constitutional theories.  Finally, in Part IV, I 
explain the challenge special laws jurisprudence poses to those theories. 
II.  SPECIAL LAWS JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Special Laws Defined 
Special laws clauses bar the granting of public benefit for private purposes.  A 
typical clause, like Nebraska’s, lists a long series of subject areas where the 
legislature may act only by general rule rather than with reference to particular cases, 
and concludes with a catch-all clause requiring all legislation to be “general” where 
possible: 
 
The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, 
that is to say: 
   For granting divorces. 
   Changing the names of persons or places. 
   Laying out, opening altering and working roads or  
highways. 
   Vacating roads, Town plats, streets, alleys, and public  
grounds. 
   Locating or changing County seats. 
   Regulating County and Township offices. 
   Regulating the practice of Courts of Justice. 
   Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the  
Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables. 
   Providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal  
cases. 
   Incorporating Cities, Towns and Villages, or changing or  
amending the charter of any Town, City, or Village. 
   Providing for the election of Officers in Townships,  
incorporated Towns or Cities. 
   Summoning or empaneling Grand or Petit Juries. 
   Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, precincts,  
school districts or other municipalities. 
   Providing for the management of Public Schools. 
   The opening and conducting of any election, or  
designating the place of voting. 
   The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors, or  
others under disability. 
   The protection of game or fish. 
   Chartering or licensing ferries, or toll bridges, remitting  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
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fines, penalties or forfeitures, creating, increasing  
and decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of  
public officers, during the term for which said  
officers are elected or appointed. 
   Changing the law of descent. 
   Granting to any corporation, association, or individual, the  
right to lay down railroad tracks, or amending  
existing charters for such purpose. 
   Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any  
special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or  
franchise whatever; Provided, that notwithstanding  
any other provisions of this Constitution, the  
Legislature shall have authority to separately define and classify loans and 
installment sales, to establish maximum rates within classifications of loans or 
installment sales which it establishes, and to regulate with respect thereto. 
In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law 
shall be enacted.10 
 
Another common version, like Illinois’s, omits the non-exhaustive list of 
prohibited subjects and explicitly adds a grant of judicial review, insisting that: “The 
General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be 
made applicable.  Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a 
matter for judicial determination.”11   
While the clauses on their face treat “special or local laws” as a single rhetorical 
phrase, typically neither “special” nor “local” earns a constitutional definition.  In 
this article, I do not attempt a comprehensive distinction between “special” and 
“local.”  Intuitively, local laws are those confined in their application to a geographic 
subunit of the state, while special laws are those that favor a particular corporation or 
person without reference to location.  Sometimes, legislatures might wish to bestow 
public benefits on a class narrowly defined by both geography and corporate 
identity, such as funding a particular company to build a bridge in a specified place; 
this legislation would presumably implicate both the “special” and “local” 
constitutional notions.   
However, the provision of state benefits to a single local public entity like a 
municipality seems to pose very different conceptual problems from those created by 
state favoritism for private firms.12  Most significantly, if a town wins an 
appropriation from the geographically representative legislature, it is likely to do so 
through ordinary politics.  Its influence might be perceived as disproportionate or 
unfair by other places with fewer delegates in the legislature, but the process remains 
overtly democratic.  In contrast, laws that advantage private entities may have been 
obtained by extraordinary campaign contributions, bribery, or other exercises of 
economic power in tension with majoritarian representation.   
                                                            
 10 NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18. 
 11 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. 
 12 See generally Recent Cases, 76 HARV. L. REV. 635, 653-55 (1963) (discussing state 
constitutional prohibitions on local laws); Charles Chauncey Binney, Restrictions Upon Local 
and Special Legislation in the United States: II: The Distinctions Between General, Local and 
Special Legislation, 32 AM. L. REG. & REV. 721 (1893) (describing special and local laws). 
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In this Article, I do not seek to examine the theoretical underpinnings for any 
potential distinctions between special and local laws.  Perhaps because whether a law 
affects a single geographic district is easier to determine objectively than whether it 
unfairly privileges a private interest, courts have often been more willing to find 
“local” laws in violation of the constitutional prohibitions.  But this Article is limited 
to the constitutional resistance to excessive economic power embodied in the 
concept of special laws.  Where I describe court cases concerning local laws, I do so 
only where the court treats the two concepts as doctrinally indistinguishable, making 
the local laws case an applicable precedent for special laws challenges. 
As in the Nebraska example quoted above, special laws prohibitions are targeted 
directly at state legislatures, both by direct reference (“The Legislature shall not . . . 
.”) and by placement in the legislative powers article of the state constitution (in 
Nebraska, article III).  Directing these clauses exclusively at the legislature leaves 
intact courts’ or administrative agencies’ power to offer public benefits (like divorce, 
name-changes, trust reformation, or welfare payments) to specific parties.  Courts 
may also continue to develop the common law, case by case, without fear of creating 
“special” laws.  Furthermore, by not placing these clauses in the states’ bills of 
rights, this structure emphasizes the role of special laws clauses as restrictions on 
legislative power rather than as grants of individual rights. 
Special laws prohibitions are just one of a variety of equality protections 
typically found in state constitutions.  Other examples include direct mimics of the 
federal Equal Protection Clause, “privileges or emoluments” prohibitions, mini-
Equal Rights Amendments, segregation prohibitions, and “common benefit” 
requirements.13  Many state constitutions include several different equality 
provisions at once.14  In this Article, I do not attempt to compare special laws 
prohibitions to the other forms of equality protection found in state constitutions, nor 
do I analyze the jurisprudence interpreting those other provisions.  Professor Jeffrey 
Shaman has consistently argued that judicial interpretations of state constitutional 
equality provisions are converging on a nationwide model exemplified by federal 
practice.15  If he is correct, as I believe, then the theoretical complications I describe 
in this Article likely apply with similar force to other clauses, but I do not expressly 
make that argument in the pages below. 
B.  History of Special Laws Prohibitions 
The earliest state constitutions insisted that legislatures could act only for the 
public benefit, but their language reflects the framers’ sense that they were merely 
memorializing an inescapable principle of natural law.  Massachusetts’s first—and 
only—constitution, for example, included the clause: “Government is instituted for 
the common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; 
and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of 
men . . . .”16 These constitutions expressed the triumph of Whig exaltation of the 
                                                            
 13 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-4 (2009).  
 14 Id. 
 15 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1123 (2003). 
 16 MASS. CONST. art. VII (1780). 
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legislature, placing in that institution the power to assert the public good over both 
aristocratic prerogatives and individual rights.17  In the social and philosophical 
context of the turn of the nineteenth century, legislatures simply could never rightly 
allocate communal resources to private parties, almost as a matter of definition.  
These republican clauses, called “commonwealth” clauses in Daniel Elazar’s 
terminology,18 owed their existence as much to philosophy19 as to any concrete social 
problem facing the early framers.   
In line with the Whig attitude toward legislative supremacy, but inconsistently 
with the early republicans’ commitment to the public good, early to mid-nineteenth 
century legislatures busied themselves with essentially adjudicatory adjustments of 
private needs such as the granting of divorces.  In Indiana, for example, the 
overwhelming majority—nearly 90%—of the legislative output of 1849-50 was 
private laws.20  Naturally, the quantity of “private bills” and the easy advantages they 
offered to well-connected supplicants attracted pernicious influences to the state 
houses.21  
This level of distraction from public business strongly motivated the delegates to 
Indiana’s 1850 constitutional convention to constrain special legislation.22  The 
quantity of private bills posed two related problems: the legislators were not 
developing and passing bills in the public interest as early republican ideals required, 
and they were passing bills to benefit their favorite patrons, in contravention of 
principles of populist control.  One leading delegate abhorred the influence of 
economic elites on the legislature, decrying the ease with which “the agents of 
corporations have been able, in the capacity of lobby members, to carry through the 
Legislature almost any measure which their principals deemed of sufficient 
importance to expend money enough to carry.”23  Interestingly, populist democrats 
were able to push special laws prohibitions through state constitutional conventions 
despite the powerful influence of corporations on the legislatures.  This seems to 
have been possible because of the characteristics of the conventions that left them 
                                                            
 17 Toward this end, early state constitutions commonly established state-supported 
religions.  See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 224-31 
(2009) (describing the state constitutional imposition of taxes to support religious institutions). 
 18 See Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 
PUBLIUS 11, 18 (1982) (describing a state constitutional pattern of “basically philosophic” text 
that emphasizes individual responsibility to the community). 
 19 See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective 
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 
59-61 (1985) (describing John Locke’s pervasive influence on late-1700s American 
constitution framers). 
 20 See Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Auditor of Monroe Cnty., 849 
N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ind. 2006) (Shepard, C.J.), quoted in. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 278. 
 21 See CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL 
LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6-7 (1894) (lamenting the disproportionate influence of 
“unscrupulous men” on legislatures overwhelmed with the production of special laws, and 
explaining state constitutional prohibitions on special laws as the popular reaction). 
 22 See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 69-70 (2006). 
 23 Id. (quoting Delegate John Morrison). 
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outside of normal establishment politics.24  Ordinary farmers and workers could find 
their way into the conventions by means they found unavailable for access to the 
legislatures.25  Then, once in the conventions, these ordinary citizens’ absence of 
further political ambition and the lack of any convention re-election fights meant that 
economic elites had limited control over the conventions’ outcome. 
By the 1830s, the dominant rationale for special laws prohibitions had shifted 
away from (but not abandoned) the commonwealth ideas associated with eighteenth 
century political philosophers and toward the more worldly worries seen in the 
Indiana convention.  In addition to the time-consuming and corrupting minutia of 
legislative adjudication, which violated the ideal of legislatures working for the 
common benefit, early nineteenth century legislatures turned their attention to 
economic development.  This would not have been problematic but for the capture of 
the legislatures by economic elites, leading to foolish investments with disastrous 
effects.26  Directly as a result of the astonishing success of New York’s investment in 
the Erie Canal, which was completed in 1825, legislatures across the country became 
entranced by large-scale infrastructure projects.27  If managed by the federal 
government, these projects might have been coordinated to develop a nationally 
stable set of prudent investments.  Instead, because the Jacksonian populists 
perceived such investment as beyond Congress’s enumerated powers, the field was 
left open for the chaotic enthusiasms of the states.28   
State debt connected with high-risk investments grew out of control; between 
1825 and 1860 the combined debt of Pennsylvania and Ohio grew from $6.7 million 
to $1.5 billion.29  Over the course of the 1830s, eighteen states contracted debt 
nearing $150 million in aggregate, mostly for highly unsound investments in 
transportation infrastructure.30  The revenue from tolls and taxes proved insufficient 
to service the states’ debt.31  By 1837, debt loads had become so unmanageable that 
nine states defaulted amidst a nationwide financial panic.32  
                                                            
 24 See, e.g., SUSAN P. FINO, THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 8 (1996) 
(noting the absence of “corporate wealth or railroad interests” from among the delegates to the 
1850 Michigan constitutional convention). 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Richard Briffault, Foreword, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and 
State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911 (2003) (describing the success of the Erie 
Canal and subsequent failure of other states’ sloppy efforts to invest in infrastructure). 
 27 See Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions 
in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 966-67 (2003) (describing the nationwide 
infrastructure bubble inflated by the financial success of the Erie Canal). 
 28 See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 110 (1998) (explaining that 
states invested in dubious infrastructure projects because national Jacksonians held Congress 
back). 
 29 Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams—A Constitutional Disgrace: 
The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public 
Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 395 (1999). 
 30 MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 85 (1957). 
 31 See Rubin, supra note 29, at 395. 
 32 See TARR, supra note 28, at 111-12. 
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The state governments’ financial burdens ultimately fell on the common 
taxpayers, of course, so populists responded to the states’ collapse and concurrent 
depression by seeking to place constitutional limits on legislative spending on 
private companies.33  Even then, some commentators doubted the feasibility of 
enforcing the newly popular restraints on legislative excess, arguing that the 
constitutions would not succeed at expressing a workable, enforceable definition of 
the prohibited appropriations.  As one anonymous critic complained, “[a]s with cant 
in general, the cant of ‘special legislation’ does not of itself afford any very definite 
notion of what is meant by it, though the purpose for which it was sounded is plain 
enough.”34  But the outraged populists carried the day.  As Charles Chauncey 
Binney, a contemporary of the anti-special legislation drafters, observed, after 1837, 
constitution framers demonstrated “a belief that legislatures are by nature utterly 
careless of the public welfare, if not hopelessly corrupt,” and therefore could not be 
trusted to invest even in public works.35  A slew of constitutional clauses meant to 
inhibit the vagabonds in the state capitols ensued. 
However, as predicted, the prohibitions on special laws adopted in the 1840s and 
1850s proved insufficient to protect the public from renewed legislative 
entanglements with risky investments after the Civil War.36  This time, railroads 
rather than canals were the trend.  To assure state investment in their companies, 
shady corporate agents routinely turned to outright bribery37 as a supplement to their 
ordinary interest-pleading.  Legislatures backed railroad-corporation junk bonds with 
state credit, invested directly in railroads, and undertook public works projects meant 
to subsidize what we might now call “railroads to nowhere.”38  
Again, a financial crisis, the depression of 1873, exacerbated the losses from the 
states’ imprudent investments, and again, new financial burdens fell on the ordinary 
taxpayer.39  The populist backlash rested on a firm belief among farmers and laborers 
that the large railroad corporations had taken control of the legislature, such that the 
most powerful economic and political forces in the state were united against the 
working class.40  Constitutional conventions in the 1870s were marked by renewed 
efforts to pull the states away from investing in private corporations, and special 
laws prohibitions were the preferred technique.41  As convention followed 
convention across the country, states added more and more restrictions on their 
                                                            
 33 See DINAN, supra note 22, at 68-69. 
 34 Special Legislation, 25 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 317 (1841). 
 35 See BINNEY, supra note 21, at 9. 
 36 See Briffault, supra note 26, at 912. 
 37 Rubin, supra note 29, at 395-96 (describing how railroad promoters won state 
investments in junk stock by bribing legislators). 
 38 See id. 
 39 See TARR, supra note 28, at 113-14. 
 40 See id. at 115; see also Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution’s Prohibition 
on Special Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for “Equal Protection” Review of Regulatory 
Legislation?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1253-54 (1996) (describing the public’s sentiment that 
powerful economic minorities had converted state legislatures to their own purposes). 
 41 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 349 (2d ed. 1984). 
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reviled legislatures, culminating in North Dakota’s 1889 list of thirty-five 
enumerated areas rendered beyond the legislature’s constitutional authority.42  
Some of the topics in the list-style prohibitions, as Dan Friedman has recently 
argued, look more like separation of powers provisions than fiscal clauses: 
legislatures were prohibited from resolving divorces, changing names, or other now-
judicial functions.43 New work by Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell 
confirms the general connection between individual rights and governmental 
structure, arguing that the federal Due Process clauses have more to do with 
separation of powers than substantive rights.44  But the remaining topics in 
constitutional lists of special laws prohibitions, such as prohibitions on lending the 
credit of the state to private entities, support the view that the constitutional framers 
operated under a presumption of legislative incompetence and unreasonableness, and 
sought constitutional methods to preclude judicial deference to the politicians’ 
economic classifications. 
From the late 1890s through the 1920s, several state courts did examine the 
purported public purposes of special legislation and, where found wanting, 
invalidated the offending statutes.  But the effects of these decisions fell far from the 
populist and progressive impetuses that motivated the adoption of special laws 
clauses.  Furthermore, the textual bases for these early exercises of vigorous judicial 
review were frequently shrouded in pre-Erie haze concerning the actual source of the 
law being applied.  As was then common with much of “constitutional” 
jurisprudence, courts commonly referred to no precise text supporting their holdings 
at all.45  As Helen Hershkoff’s insight on Lochner-era state constitutional 
jurisprudence demonstrates, state high courts during this period had yet to fully 
embrace the supremacy of state constitutional text over the common law.46  One 
effect of this tension was a generic judicial hostility to aid for the poor, which 
legislatures had undertaken by private bills before the rise of the administrative 
state.47  When invited to attack these poor-relief private bills, courts found in special 
                                                            
 42 See id. 
 43 See Dan Freidman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory to the Interpretation of 
State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 411, 443-44 
(2012). 
 44 See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1755-73 (2012) (describing categories of property deprivation 
properly conducted only by courts). 
 45 Cf. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions are not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's 
Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993) (arguing that state courts should interpret state 
constitutions, without reference to federal jurisprudence, because they are positive law of the 
state). 
 46 See Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1544-46 (2010) 
(describing the anti-poor effects of the contest between constitutional and common law 
supremacy). 
 47 See Charles Warren, Massachusetts as a Philanthropic Robber, 12 HARV. L. REV. 316, 
317-19 (1898) (cataloging legislative efforts to provide pensions, disability benefits, and poor 
relief by special legislation). 
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laws prohibitions a welcome excuse to bar legislative appropriation for redistributive 
purposes.48 
For example, a well-researched, carefully written Hawai‘i case from the 
territorial Supreme Court invalidated a legislative appropriation intended to 
compensate the victim for a fine he paid pursuant to a wrongful conviction (for 
conspiring to rebel against the Dole Republic49 in favor of the deposed monarch).50  
The Cummins court believed that the legislature’s lack of any legal obligation to the 
intended beneficiary rendered the appropriation merely a gift, and the legislature had 
no power to use the public purse to give gifts to its private friends.  The basis for this 
holding was a “fundamental” limit on the legislature, but for support the court 
pointed merely to a treatise by Cooley and the opinions of various states’ courts 
rather than any clause of federal or territorial positive law.  
Similarly, in the earlier case of Mead v. Acton, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court approved the argument of municipal taxpayers to invalidate the Town 
of Acton’s 1882 effort to award retroactive enlistment bonuses to Civil War 
veterans.51  The court based its decision on what it determined to be the inherent 
meaning of the term “taxation,” which by definition (the court held) excludes the 
raising of funds for private benefit.52  The court could imagine no public purpose for 
the payments, because the Acton veterans in question never expected the bonuses 
when they signed their paperwork to stay in the fight in Louisiana.  Even if they had, 
the moral obligation would fall on the state, not the town.  And even if towns had 
been responsible for enlistment bonuses, the passage of time meant that Acton 
lacked any reason to provide incentives for military recruitment for a war long past.53  
Elsewhere, courts did identify a specific text as their source for invalidating 
legislation in aid of private parties, but they sometimes cited special laws 
prohibitions and at other times relied upon the much older republican provisions54 
setting forth the legislature’s establishment for public benefit.  
                                                            
 48 See Helen Hershkoff, Foreword, Positive Rights and the Evolution of State 
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 821-23 and nn.97-98 (2002) (describing redistributive 
welfare before the administrative state as the product of private bills). 
 49 Hawai‘i was controlled by plantation owners under the presidency of Sanford Dole 
between 1893, when U.S. Marines committed a coup d’état against the last queen, and 1898, 
when Congress annexed the islands as a territory.  See generally Jennifer M.L. Chock, One 
Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 HAW. L. REV. 463, 
465-66 (1995) (describing Hawai‘i’s tortuous, and arguably tortious, path to statehood). 
 50 In re Appeal of Cummins, 20 Haw. 518, 529 (1911). 
 51 Mead v. Acton, 1 N.E. 413 (Mass. 1885). 
 52 Id. at 415. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All men when they form a social compact, are equal 
in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges 
from the community.”).  
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/8
2012] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS 731 
 
Today, courts and legislatures alike generally treat these commonwealth 
clauses—with one notable exception55—as hortatory, like the federal Preamble.  
Even after the Mead case in Massachusetts, the legislature continued providing 
special appropriations to benefit particular individuals.  These benefits included the 
provision of pensions to state workers and their survivors, even where the workers 
had not contracted for them; salary payments to state workers injured on the job, 
whether by the tortious conduct of others or by accident, even where contracts did 
not compel them; and (again) payments to individuals who had been convicted but 
then pardoned or otherwise determined to be wrongfully convicted.56  Of course, 
many payments also went to high officials for less transparently benevolent 
purposes, such as to the heirs of deceased legislators.57   
These grants of public money to private persons so infuriated one well-known 
Boston lawyer that he described the Commonwealth as a “philanthropic robber.”58  
This nefarious reliance on special laws came to pass, he argued, because of what we 
now call collective-action problems.  The woebegone family of an injured state 
worker would seek relief from the local representative, who would then raise the 
issue in committee, which would have no time or inclination to dispute the point.  
The “debate” would attract no attention from the public, but would be closely 
attended by the parties seeking the appropriation.  Finally, in exchange for similar 
treatment for their constituents, the proponent’s colleagues would back the grant, 
with no incentives for anyone to resist.59  During the 1890s, Massachusetts spent 
between eight and eighteen thousand dollars per year on these grants.60  For well-
heeled opponents of these one-by-one appropriations, the legislature exceeded its 
power any time it awarded a single dollar to specific individuals beyond its minimal 
legal obligation.   
Even with the current political climate’s skeptical approach toward state workers, 
few would advocate against the payment of benefits to a man injured while 
protecting state property from rioters, or to a prison guard disabled while at work.61  
But today’s more forgiving attitude may in part reflect legislative correction of the 
haphazard method of awarding benefits historically attacked as special laws.  
Eventually, legislatures passed prospective general statutes awarding pensions, 
disability benefits, and the like to state workers, thereby avoiding the concern that 
private parties were raiding the treasury piecemeal, based on their personal powers 
of persuasion or political connectedness.  No longer does an injured worker’s relief 
depend on the vagaries of statehouse politics or the clout of his own representative.  
In addition, these statutes made more obvious the link between the provision of 
                                                            
 55 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (relying upon the “common benefits” 
clause of the Vermont constitution to require equal treatment under law for opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples). 
 56 See Warren, supra note 47, at 317-19. 
 57 Id. at 319. 
 58 Id. at 334. 
 59 Id. 
60 Id.  The average cost of food for a family of five in the 1890s was about $300 annually.   
See The Cost of Living, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1903 (citing a study by Carrol D. Wright).  
 
 61 Cf. Warren, supra note 47, at 334 (arguing against such payments). 
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adequate benefits for state workers and the workers’ incentives to join or remain in 
the state’s service; thus, the public’s direct advantage from these arrangements 
became more apparent.  Nevertheless, the public retains an intuition that public 
appropriations for state workers beyond their legal entitlement treads on the rights of 
the taxpayers.  For example, a public commission’s award of substantial severance 
pay beyond what the employee’s contract seemed to require recently sparked local 
outrage, official investigation, and lawsuits.62  
By 1931, a commentator observed a clear gap between how much discretion 
special laws prohibitions seemed to afford legislatures and how much the courts 
actually provided.63 States needed to fight the Great Depression with public 
investment, and courts rapidly began their retreat from meaningful application of the 
special laws clauses.64 In the next part, I address modern court approaches to these 
clauses. 
C.  Judicial Interpretations 
Contemporary courts commonly apply “rational-basis review” when interpreting 
state constitutional special laws prohibitions.65  Some courts have even expressly 
identified their special laws prohibitions as equivalent to equal protection under the 
federal Fourteenth Amendment.  One consequence of treating these cases as 
conventional economic-classification equal protection problems is the courts’ failure 
to think seriously about remedies.  In some cases, litigants seek to invalidate a 
privilege bestowed on a politically favored competitor.  In others, litigants seek only 
to win the same privilege for themselves on an equal footing, treating the special law 
as a burden that unfairly singles out a disfavored plaintiff rather than a privilege.  
Contemporary courts mimicking federal equal protection doctrine almost never 
consider whether the “special” law is a rare benefit for the plaintiff’s adversary or an 
unjustly particularized burden on the plaintiff, and so miss the chance to analyze 
whether the special laws prohibitions should apply at all.  A law passed for private 
gain without public benefit should, under the plain text of the constitutional 
prohibitions, always be rendered void.  To extend its improper benefits to the 
targets’ economic competitors is merely to compound the wrong. But equal 
protection doctrine, being founded on different concerns, does not require courts to 
consider this problem. 
As early as 1958, the New Jersey Supreme Court (a national leader in state 
constitutional interpretation) held its constitutional prohibition on special laws66 to 
be congruent with federal rational-basis equal protection.67  The court affirmed that 
                                                            
 62 See Steve Pardo, Wayne County Expected to Ban Severance Payments in Wake of 
Mullin Deal, DET. NEWS, Jan. 12, 2012, at A4. 
 63 Walter F. Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of State Constitutions, 80 U. PA. 
L. REV. 54, 60 (1931). 
 64 See Briffault, supra note 26, at 912-13. 
 65 See SHAMAN, supra note 13, at 36. 
 66 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, para. 9 (“The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or 
local laws . . . [g]ranting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, 
immunity or franchise whatever.”).  
 67 See Robson v. Rodriguez, 141 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1958) (equating the special laws prohibition 
with equal protection).  But see Randy Samson, Comment, Atlantic City Special: Whether the 
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approach in a case challenging a statutory exemption from hospital licensing 
requirements for a narrowly defined non-profit planning to build a new facility.68  
The plaintiff, a hospital corporation already possessing a facility, asked the court to 
invalidate the legislative privilege of exemption from certificate-of-need 
requirements afforded to its rival.69  Facing simultaneous claims under the federal 
equal protection clause and the state’s prohibition on special laws, the court noted 
that the court below had “acknowledged” that the two clauses called for the same 
test, and later asserted directly that, “The propriety of exclusions must be examined 
utilizing the principles generally applicable to [federal] equal protection.”70  Under 
that highly deferential review of economic classifications, the court found no 
difficulty in concluding that a “rational basis” supported the legislation.71  
The Illinois constitution not only prohibits special laws, it expressly declares that 
“[w]hether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial 
determination.”72  Yet the Supreme Court there has held that this prohibition is 
identical in effect to an equal protection clause, and that the same standard of equal 
protection applies under both the state and federal constitutions.73  Consequently, 
where the legislature had enacted a protection from competing new franchises for 
existing auto dealerships but not for existing franchises of other industries, the 
Illinois Supreme Court needed barely a paragraph to determine that the statute was 
rationally related to the legitimate purpose of “protecting the public from harmful 
franchise practices by automobile manufacturers.”74  The franchisor’s effort to void 
the statutory privilege protecting existing dealerships failed.75 
In Nevada, the special laws prohibition declares that “In all cases . . . where a 
general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform 
operation throughout the State.”76  But in a case concerning reduced procedural 
                                                                                                                                            
Casino Exception to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act Comports with the New Jersey 
Constitution’s General Prohibition of Special Laws, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 379-80 
(2008) (arguing that whether the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguishes between legislation 
rationally related to any conceivable purpose and legislation rationally related to its actual 
purpose is an open question). 
 68 See Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36 (N.J. 1981) 
(treating the special laws prohibition as equivalent to federal equal protection). 
 69 Id. at 43. 
 70 Id. at 45. 
 71 See id. at 46. 
 72 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (“The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law 
when a general law is or can be made applicable.  Whether a general law is or can be made 
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.”). 
 73 See General Motors Corp. v. Ill. State Motor Vehicle Rev. Bd., 862 N.E.2d 209, 229 
(Ill. 2007).  But cf. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070 (Ill. 1997) 
(purporting to apply special laws analysis equivalent to federal Fourteenth Amendment 
rational-basis review, but invalidating a statute capping non-economic damages in medical 
malpractice tort litigation). 
 74 See General Motors Corp., 862 N.E.2d at 229 (Ill. 2007). 
 75 Id. 
 76 NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 21. 
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protections for civil claims under $50,000,77 the Supreme Court cited its special laws 
prohibition but applied, without analysis, its longstanding doctrine treating the state 
constitutional prohibition on special laws as indistinguishable from federal equal 
protection.  After conducting a single rational-basis review simultaneously addressed 
to both constitutional claims, the court rebuffed the challenge presented under both 
constitutions because it was rational for the legislature to devise different procedures 
for high- and low-value lawsuits.78  It is, indeed, quite rational to offer more cost-
effective procedural protections for low-value civil claims than for high-value 
claims.  And perhaps the legislature was not subject to nefarious capture by 
politically important low-value repeat plaintiffs seeking expedited methods to 
collect, say, gambling debts.  But these are distinct questions.  On its face, the 
constitutional prohibition requires the court to determine whether a “general law” 
could have applied to both high-value and low-value cases.  By following federal 
doctrine instead of its own text, the Nevada Court never even began this basic 
inquiry. 
Wyoming lacks a single state constitutional equal protection clause, but does 
prohibit special laws.79  In a tort case, plaintiffs argued that governmental immunity 
for the local irrigation district violated the state constitution because the district was 
not funded by state taxpayers.80  The Supreme Court treated a “cluster” of state 
constitutional clauses, including the prohibition on special laws, as “the state’s 
functional equivalent of the federal equal protection clause,” without discussing why 
these clauses should be treated in that way.81  Following federal practice, the court 
considered whether the statutory grant of immunity was “rationally related” to the 
achievement of an “appropriate legislative purpose,” and determined, on the basis of 
a rationale not stated in the legislative history, that the plaintiffs had not carried their 
“heavy burden” to establish the legislation’s irrationality.82 
Most state high courts interpret special laws prohibitions with extraordinary self-
restraint.83  Even in states that have not expressly determined their special laws 
                                                            
 77 Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490 (Nev. 2009) (calling the special laws prohibition an 
“equal protection” clause and treating it as equivalent to federal equal protection); see also 
Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 817 (Nev. 2005) (treating the special laws prohibition as 
identical to the federal Fourteenth Amendment); Barrett v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689, 698 (Nev. 
1995) (holding, without analysis, that “[t]he standard for testing the validity of legislation 
under the equal protection clause of the state constitution is the same as the federal 
standard.”), overruled on other grounds by Lioce v. Cohen, 174 P.3d 970 (Nev. 2008). 
 78 See Zamora, 213 P.3d at 495. 
 79 See WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 27 (“The legislature shall not pass local or special laws [in a 
range of enumerated situations].  In all other cases where a general law can be made 
applicable no special law shall be enacted.”). 
 80 Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 200 P.3d 774 (Wyo. 2009). 
 81 Id. at 784 n.4. 
 82 See id. at 784-85.  If the plaintiffs had prevailed, the district’s statutorily granted 
privilege would have been voided, not extended to the plaintiffs, making this more like a 
conventional special laws issue. 
 83 At least twenty-nine states apply a rational-basis or similarly lax test to special laws. 
The following list does not include states that apply a rational-basis-with-teeth, slightly more 
rigorous, review.  See Ala. Power Co. v. Citizens of Ala., 740 So. 2d 371, 385-87 (Ala.1999) 
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(holding that any public purpose is sufficient to sustain a statute against a special laws 
challenge); Pebble v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2009) (holding the special laws clause 
satisfied if the statute “bears a fair and substantial relationship to legitimate purposes,” which 
the court describes as equivalent to a “reasonableness” test); O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 
162 P.3d 583, 592 (Cal. 2007) (holding that the special laws prohibition does not prohibit 
legislation with a “rational basis”); Gilemmo v. Cousineau, 694 S.E.2d 75, 77-78 (Ga. 2010) 
(holding a statute constitutional if it operates “uniformly” and is not “arbitrary” or 
“unreasonable”); Arel v. T & L Enters, 189 P.3d 1149, 1155-56 (Idaho 2008) (holding that a 
statute is constitutional if it is not “arbitrary” or “unreasonable”); General Motors Corp. v. Ill. 
Motor Vehicle Review Bd., 862 N.E.2d 209, 228-29 (Ill. 2007) (applying federal rational-
basis review to a special laws challenge); Christopher R. Brown, D.D.S., Inc., v. Decatur 
Cnty. Mem’l. Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 2008) (finding no special laws violation where the 
legislative classification is “reasonably related” to the “inherent” differences between classes); 
City of Coralville v. Iowa Utils Bd., 750 N.W.2d 523, 530-31 (Iowa 2008) (applying rational-
basis review to special laws challenge); Johnson v. Gans Furniture Indus., 114 S.W.3d 850, 
856-57 (Ky. 2003) (holding that legislative classifications must be “natural,” meaning that the 
statute reasonably distinguishes between classes for a rational purpose); Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 
976 A.2d 279, 288-89 (Md. 2009) (holding that laws are not “special” if they are not 
unreasonable or arbitrary); Oxford Asset Partners, LLC v. City of Oxford, 970 So. 2d 116 
(Miss. 2006) (applying highly deferential review); Alderson v. State, 273 S.W.3d 533, 538-39 
(Mo. 2009) (treating state prohibition on special laws as equivalent to federal Equal Protection 
Clause); Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 227 P.3d 42, 45-47 (Mont. 2009) (upholding statute 
where the legislative classification was “reasonable”); Yant v. City of Grand Island, 784 
N.W.2d 101, (Neb. 2010) (upholding a legislative classification where distinction was 
“reasonable”); Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 495 (Nev. 2009) (treating special laws 
prohibition as equivalent to federal Equal Protection Clause); Jordan v. Horsemen’s 
Benevolent & Protective Ass’n., 448 A.2d 462, 467-69 (N.J. 1982) (holding that if there exists 
“any conceivable state of facts” that would make the legislative classification reasonable, the 
law does  not violate the special laws prohibition); Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 
428, 434-35 (N.M.1995) (holding that so long as a statute is supported by more than “mere 
caprice,” it does not violate the special laws prohibition); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for 
Cultural Res., 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1288-92 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that so long as the class might 
someday expand, the statute does not violate the special laws prohibition); Williams v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 581 S.E.2d 415, 425-29 (N.C. 2003) (upholding a legislative classification 
where the statute had a “reasonable basis”); Teigen v. State, 749 N.W.2d 505, 509-14 (N.D. 
2008) (applying a “reasonableness” standard to evaluate the legislative classification); Pa. 
Tpk. Comm’n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094-97 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the state 
special laws clause is equivalent to federal equal protection doctrine); Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. Schreiner, 492 N.W.2d 916, 924-25 (S.D. 1992) (holding that a legislative 
classification is constitutional so long as it applies to all members of the class defined by the 
statute); McCarver v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 208 S.W.3d 380, 384-85 (Tenn. 2006) (upholding a 
legislative classification so long as it has a “rational basis”); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 
795 P.2d 622, 636 (Utah 1990) (upholding a legislative grant of tort immunity (to a private 
railroad!) because the classification was reasonable); Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass’n v. 
Gwinn, 551 S.E.2d 339, 344-46 (Va. 2001) (upholding a “reasonable” legislative 
classification that affected a single private firm); Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control, 90 P.3d 
659, 689-90 (Wash. 2004) (holding that any “rational” classification would satisfy the 
constitutional special laws clause); Gallant v. Cnty. Comm’n, 575 S.E.2d 222, 229-31 (W. Va. 
2002) (finding no constitutional violation where the legislative classification was reasonably 
related to the statute’s purpose); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 430-33 (Wis. 
1996) (upholding tax exemptions that benefitted a single for-profit professional sports team); 
Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 200 P.3d 774, 784 n.4 (Wyo. 2009) (treating the 
special laws prohibition as equivalent to federal equal protection). 
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prohibitions to be repetitive of federal equal protection standards, the caselaw 
broadly tracks the highly deferential standards of ordinary federal rational-basis 
review.  For example, Alaska’s Supreme Court has upheld as not “special” a 
pollution-prevention ballot proposal applicable to only two specific mines;84  
Massachusetts’s justices have opined that a statute obligating the state treasurer to 
issue bonds, pay the receipts in part to private rail companies, and then collect 
reimbursement from the companies in intervals over time was not impermissibly 
lending the credit of the commonwealth for private benefit;85 and the New York 
Court of Appeals denied that a statute providing tax benefits solely to the Museum of 
Modern Art violated the constitutional prohibition on special-law tax exemptions.86  
As a matter of public policy, these decisions might very well be sound.  It is quite 
plausible that the challenged statutes were not the result of logrolling, or legislative 
capture, or a desire to evade political accountability for laws that would have earned 
broad opposition if more generally applied.87  We will never know, because under 
such deferential interpretations of their special laws prohibitions, the courts never 
asked. 
Despite the general trend, a few state high courts do give independent meaning to 
their constitutional special laws prohibitions.  State courts have rarely been accused 
of rigid adherence to doctrinal coherency.  Sometimes, even where the special laws 
prohibitions are treated as equivalent to federal equal protection, the courts apply 
rational basis with teeth.88 In Weiss v. Geisbauer, for example, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court confirmed that it applies a “‘rational basis’ standard of review when 
determining whether legislation is special or local” under the state constitution’s 
prohibitory clause and explicitly matched that analysis with federal equal 
protection.89  Then the Court faced a statute that gave tax advantages to gas stations 
in cities abutting the state line running through the Mississippi River, but not to 
border cities on other rivers.90  Surely, the court observed, the legislature was 
sensible to perceive a different risk to tax revenue between cities where the motorist 
would only need to cross a street to find cheaper fuel and cities where the motorist 
                                                            
 84 See Pebble Ltd. P’ship v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2009). The mine owners 
sought to invalidate the proposed legislation as a special burden, not a special benefit. 
 85 See Opinion of the Justices, 660 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Mass. 1996).  Here, the challengers 
sought a remedy of invalidating the bonds, rather than seeking additional bonds for 
themselves. 
 86 See Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Res., 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (N.Y. 1978). 
Plaintiffs, business rivals to the museum, sought to invalidate the tax exemptions rather than 
to win them for themselves. 
 87 Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those 
officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape 
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.”).  
 88 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rational-basis review under the 
federal equal protection clause, but nevertheless invalidating a state constitutional amendment 
discriminating against a non-suspect class).  
 89 Weiss v. Geisbauer, 215 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Ark. 2005).  The state constitution prohibits 
the legislature from passing “any local or special act.” ARK. CONST. amend. 14 (1926). 
 90 Weiss, 215 S.W.3d at 629. 
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would confront an impassable waterway or a burdensome trip over a bridge to save 
pennies on the gallon.91  But distinguishing between cities on one river or another, 
the court held, was simply irrational.92  (Interestingly, the court purported to exercise 
its own imagination to find some basis for the legislation;93 as with conventional 
rational-basis review, there was no inquiry into the legislature’s rationale-in-fact.)94  
The court concluded that because the distinction was irrational, the statute violated 
the special laws prohibition.  The court remedied the violation by striking the 
favorable treatment provided to Mississippi River towns rather than by extending the 
benefit to the disfavored riparian plaintiff.95 
These unusual state high courts have developed genuinely non-federal 
jurisprudence, but they have failed to define special laws in a consistently coherent 
or logical way.  The slipperiness and unpredictability of these doctrines suggests that 
perhaps state high courts are not more frequently applying special laws prohibitions 
independently because the task is simply impossible.  When is a law a benefit to one 
class instead of a burden on the class’s mirror image?  When is a law directed in 
favor of a mere subset of the “truly” relevant class, and when is the law properly 
directed at the entirety of the class?  As a question of philosophical logic, these 
questions can yield no meaningful answer.  But law has never been bound by 
mathematical rigor,96 and the difficulty of line-drawing is far from unique to special 
laws.  Law is a human creation, and the act of judging is political, social, and 
overwhelmingly human.  More interesting, then, than the question of whether a 
logically rigorous meaning can be afforded to the phrase “special laws” is the 
question of how courts ought to consider these clauses within the social and political 
contexts in which they operate.  
For an example, let us examine the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its 
constitution’s article IV.  This article, which is devoted to structuring and limiting 
the legislature, contains a clause prohibiting the passage of “local or special laws” in 
a variety of enumerated contexts, including divorces, changing names, and (most 
importantly), “[w]hen a general law can be made applicable.”97  In Republic 
Investment Fund v. Surprise,98 the Arizona Supreme Court considered challenges to 
                                                            
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. at 632. 
 93 See id. (“The court can find no basis upon which to justify [the distinction]” (emphasis 
added)). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. at 633. 
 96 See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) (holding, for cultural reasons despite 
scientific evidence to the contrary, that tomatoes are a vegetable and not a fruit because they 
are rarely eaten for dessert). 
 97 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 19.  The 1910 Arizona Constitutional Convention that 
wrote this clause left no record of any deeper purpose beyond the surface meaning.  See Roger 
C. Henderson, Tort Reform, Separation of Powers, and the Arizona Constitutional Convention 
of 1910, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 535, 577 n.31 (1993). 
 98 Republic Inv. Fund v. Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990).  As stated in the text, while 
this case deals with the prohibition on geographically-limiting “local” laws, the Arizona court 
applied reasoning indistinguishable from its economically-limiting “special” laws 
jurisprudence.  See also Sherman v. City of Tempe, 45 P.3d 336, 342 (Ariz. 2002) (upholding 
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a statute meant to reform the process by which towns “deannexed” parts of their 
land.  The statute placed restrictions on towns “having a population of less than ten 
thousand persons according to the 1980 United States decennial census within a 
county having a population in excess of one million two hundred thousand persons 
according to the 1980 United States decennial census,” which affected only twelve 
municipalities within a single county.99  Applying a 1981 precedent that expressly 
distinguished between equal protection and the prohibition on special laws based on 
the difference between burdens and benefits, the court addressed the mystical 
question of whether the statute burdened the dozen towns to which it applied or 
benefitted all other towns and concluded that both perspectives required 
constitutional justification.100    
The court easily determined the statute’s burden on the dozen towns to be 
rationally related to a legitimate purpose, and therefore satisfactory under the state’s 
federal-style equal protection analysis.  The special laws prohibition, however, 
required more.  The court realized that the Arizona special laws prohibition had a 
distinct purpose from equal protection: “to avoid the evils created by a patchwork 
type of legal system where some laws applied in a few locations while others applied 
elsewhere.”101  This rationale clearly applies only to “local” laws (and makes little 
sense in any event where municipalities may pass local ordinances, thereby creating 
a “patchwork” of laws).  The court in Republic Investment had before it a challenge 
to “local” rather than, strictly speaking, “special” laws, but it explicitly linked both 
special and local laws as subject to the same analysis.  That analysis proceeded in 
two steps: first, the Court determined whether the law applied evenly to all members 
of the relevant class, i.e. the class of entities the legislature sought to regulate 
through the particular statute under challenge.  Once the court deemed the class 
defined by the statute as “legitimate,” it went on to test whether the class was 
“elastic.”  A class is elastic if members can exit or others can enter the class.  In 
Republic Investment, the statute limited the class to municipalities meeting 
demographic characteristics as of a fixed moment in time, and therefore those 
municipalities would always belong to the class and no other municipalities would 
ever qualify.  In contrast, the Court pointed out, a statute that limits a class to cities 
of a certain population might apply to only one city at the time of passage, but future 
cities could grow into the class or the existing city could shrink out of it.102  The 
deannexation statute’s applicability to only a closed set, therefore, doomed it as a 
prohibited “special law.”103  
                                                                                                                                            
a charter provision against special laws scrutiny because it bore a “rational relationship to [a] 
legitimate government objective” and applied to all members of the “relevant” class and the 
class membership could change over time); Big D. Constr. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 789 
P.2d 1061, 1071 (Ariz. 1990) (holding a statute invalid under both the equal protection and 
special laws clauses of the Arizona constitution). 
 99 See Republic Inv. Fund, 800 P.2d at 1255. 
 100 See id. at 1256. 
 101 Id. at 1257. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. 
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Rather than invalidate the “benefit” of exemption from the deannexation statute 
for the other towns, however, the court invalidated the statute’s burden on the dozen 
municipalities fixed in the class.104  Without saying so directly, the court seems to 
have shifted its consideration of the burden/benefit distinction from benefitted 
towns/burdened towns to benefitted landowners/burdened landowners.  The 
deannexation statute burdened a dozen towns, but for the benefit of landowners in 
those towns who opposed annexation.  “Because a general law would have provided 
a remedy to individuals in all areas annexed by large or small cities within the state, 
as indicated by the original bill, the statute's limited application violates the special 
law prohibition.”105  Of course, the class of landowners who benefitted from the 
deannexation statute was always open; anyone could unexpectedly and suddenly 
decide to buy land in Surprise,106 and anyone can get sick of Maricopa County and 
leave town.107  
Because the court left its shift from concern for benefitted towns to concern for 
benefitted landowners unspoken, the opinion offers no explanation for the logical 
difference between the closed class of towns and the open class of landowners.  The 
court never articulated why the remedy was to invalidate the statute rather than 
require the statute’s application to the entire “relevant” class (which was, the court 
believed, at least all of those municipalities large and small that had previously 
abused loopholes in the prior annexation regime).108 
The court’s remedy benefitted the plaintiff towns at the expense of local land 
developers.  The opinion leading to that remedy explained the seeming purpose of 
the deannexation statute overall (to fix “abuses” of the prior procedure by towns 
including Surprise), but offered no discussion of why the statute was limited to only 
twelve towns when the problem had been much broader.  Perhaps the court reached 
its constitutional conclusion because it was concerned about land speculators taking 
advantage of small towns in a changed real estate market; perhaps the justices were 
informally aware of legislative capture by the developers but lacked a basis to 
include that problem in their opinion.  In any event, the court’s firm rhetoric, 
repeated insistence that the special laws prohibition is more stringent than the state’s 
equal protection clause, and ultimately articulation of a test that leaves the court 
itself with wide discretion must have sent a distinct message to the legislature.  
While outsiders to Arizona politics of the early 1990s might never know the full 
meaning of that message, such an activist application of judicial review might well 
have been perceived as a significant intervention by the statute’s sponsors.109 
                                                            
 104 See id. at 1258. 
 105 Id. at 1259. 
 106 See, e.g., Homes, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/homes/surprise,-arizona_rb/#/homes/ 
for_sale/Surprise-AZ/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (listing homes for sale in Surprise).   
 
 107 For example, Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor. 
 108 See Republic Inv. Fund, 800 P.2d at 1257. 
 109 See LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 35 (2002) (noting that “policy pronouncements from any member on the bench are 
typically frowned upon in most legislatures, especially when it [sic] involves . . . a fiscal 
matter.”). 
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Likewise, in Lawnwood Medical Center v. Seeger, the Florida Supreme Court 
applied its constitutional prohibition110 on special laws to invalidate a legislative 
economic classification.111  The legislature had passed a statute meant to resolve a 
dispute between the medical staff and the board of a private, for-profit hospital.  
After having failed to prevail in court on several attempts to discipline two 
controversial pathologists, the governing board sought relief at the statehouse.112  
The legislature responded with an admittedly “special” law applying only to the two 
private hospitals in St. Lucie County owned by the same corporation that would 
solidify the board’s control over the medical staff.  The Court considered and 
rejected the hospital’s argument that the statute, while “special,” was not a 
prohibited “grant of privilege” because it provided no direct financial benefit to the 
corporation.113  Rather than giving to credence to the purported legislative purpose of 
patient safety, the Court applied dictionary definitions of “privilege” to conclude that 
the statute’s grant of unilateral control over the medical by-laws to the board violated 
the constitution.114  The Court determined the entire statute irredeemable, leaving 
none of the governance privileges it had awarded the board in place.115  This case 
stands as one of the most vigorous enforcements of special laws prohibitions by a 
modern court.  
While Lawnwood was richly larded with rhetoric of respect for the legislature,116 
the court’s opinion included two features that suggest a different concern.  First, the 
opinion opens with a careful exposition of the prior disputes in court between the 
medical staff and the board.117  The board, dissatisfied with the two pathologists, had 
suspended them through procedures later found improper by a state court.  The board 
responded to that court’s judgment by firing the medical officers, and again lost in 
state court.  Again, the board responded aggressively by attempting to unilaterally 
amend the medical by-laws, and finally turned to the legislature when the staff 
would not recognize the newly imposed rules.  By invalidating the statute in its 
entirety, the Lawnwood court restored the practical effect and power of the earlier 
trial court decisions.  The Supreme Court’s review of the history of that prior 
litigation was not strictly necessary for the Supreme Court’s special laws analysis.  
But it establishes a narrative in which the legislature, not the courts, is the activist 
institution inappropriately transgressing the separation of powers.   
                                                            
 110 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a) (“There shall be no special law or general law of local 
application pertaining to . . . grant of privilege to a private corporation.”). 
 111 Lawnwood Med. Ctr. V. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008). 
 112 See id. at 507. 
 113 See id. at 510, 513-14. 
 114 See id.  The court was supported in this result by amicus briefs on behalf of the medical 
staff from the American Medical Association, the Florida Medical Association, and the 
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons.  Id. at 506 n.1. 
 115 See id. at 518. 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 509 (“We do not take lightly a contention that a statute passed by the 
Legislature is unconstitutional and we start with the well-established principle that a 
legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional.”). 
 117 See id. at 507. 
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This story also ties the dispute more closely to the constitutional provision itself, 
which is the second key feature that might explain the result in Lawnwood.  The 
Florida constitution of 1885, the court explained, prohibited a broad list of special 
legislation in areas like criminal penalties, divorces, name changes, adoption, and the 
recognition of wills.118  In this context, the legislature could still establish general 
standards for proving the need for a divorce, etc., but was excluded from piecemeal 
legislation changing a single person’s name or confirming the validity of a specific 
(otherwise insufficient) will.  These specific prohibitions were carried forward and 
expanded in the 1968 constitution, including the addition of the bar on granting 
“privileges” to private corporations.119  “One purpose of expanding the scope of 
prohibitions of special laws,” the Court said, “was to prevent state action benefiting 
local or private interests and to direct the Legislature to focus on issues of statewide 
importance.”120   
Looking over the list of areas excluded from special legislation reveals how very 
judicial these functions are today.121  Lawnwood, then, looks less like a case of 
irrational economic discrimination (after all, the invalid statute did not include any 
appropriation of funds or taxation) and more like a turf battle between the judiciary 
and legislature.  Dan Friedman, an expert on Maryland constitutional law, has argued 
that the special laws prohibition there is primarily directed at separation of powers,122 
a view Lanwood suggests might apply more generally.  In the next Part, I address the 
theoretical consequences of state courts’ refusal to enforce these constitutional 
provisions. 
D.  Approaches to Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Special Laws Prohibitions 
State constitutional scholarship has a tendency to swing from phases of self-
confident enthusiasm123 to periods of self-doubt.124  In that context, the story of 
special laws prohibitions may offer a middle way.  Having reviewed the cases, 
disciples of the Linde125-Williams126 positivist, anti-lockstepping school of state 
                                                            
 118 See id. at 514 n.12. 
 119 See id. at 514 n.13. 
 120 Id. at 513. 
 121 At the federal level, some of these functions fall more to administrators in the Executive 
Branch than to courts, but the judicial role in these areas at the state level is one of the 
characteristics of state judiciaries that distinguishes them from federal courts.  See Helen 
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1872-75 (2001) (describing state courts’ administrative roles) 
 122 See Freidman, supra note 43, at 443. 
 123 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Nelson, supra note 2; Judith S. Kaye, Brennan Lecture, 
State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and 
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 124 See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 
(1985); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
761 (1992); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243 
(2011). 
 125 See generally Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 
215 (1992). 
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constitutionalism might be surprised that the courts give such federally-dependent 
readings to textual provisions that lack any analogue in the federal Constitution.  
Disciples of the Cooley127-Cover128-Kahn129-Schapiro130 polyphonic, discursive 
school of state constitutionalism might not be surprised by the federalist and not-
particularly-positivist caselaw, but might still wonder a bit at the weakness of special 
laws enforcement.  In this Part, I seek to lay out the leading reasons for why one 
should expect courts to behave as they do (by not giving vigorous, autonomous 
meaning to the prohibitions) and why, conversely, one should not.  By playing out 
these rationales, I intend this Part to clarify what function these clauses play in state 
constitutions and the limits of what we can hope for from them.  
To start, one might be surprised by the courts’ reliance on special laws analysis 
derived from the federal Fourteenth Amendment, because the social evils the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to address were so transparently different from 
the problems that inspired the special laws prohibitions.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, like the other Reconstruction amendments, was meant to advance racial 
equality.131  Federal jurisprudence interpreting it has fixated on protection for 
“suspect classes,” not generic equal protection for all social and economic rights.132  
No evidence suggests that special laws prohibitions, in contrast, were motivated 
anywhere by a popular will to protect any particular class members bearing any 
disfavored characteristics of identity.  Instead, as discussed above in Part I, these 
clauses originated specifically in response to economic inequality and were intended 
from the start to protect the People from oppression by the combination of abusive 
economic and political institutions.133  This distinction undermines the applicability 
of federal precedents directed primarily at racial equality to state constitutional 
clauses directed at economic abuses.  State courts’ inattention to this distinction 
should be surprising, because it conflicts with the interpretive convention that state 
constitutional interpretation should engage with the social, political, and economic 
                                                                                                                                            
 126 See generally Robert F. Williams, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms: State 
Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective 
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005). 
 127 See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868). 
 128 See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: 
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). 
 129 See generally Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993). 
 130 See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 243 (2005). 
 131 See Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 603-05 (2003). 
 132 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (establishing strict scrutiny 
for racial classifications). 
 133 See, e.g., Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution’s Prohibition on Special 
Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for “Equal Protection” Review of Regulatory 
Legislation?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1996) (contrasting the history of the Washington 
special laws prohibition with that of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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context in which the document was formed—the interpretive approach generally 
called “originalism.”134  This gap between observed state court practice and the 
theoretically expected behavior calls for alternative explanations.135  
More broadly, courts might not be willing to engage in a strong and autonomous 
interpretation of special laws prohibitions because to do so would require a searching 
inquiry into the legislative process.  If a court were to seriously pursue the clauses’ 
apparent purpose of resisting legislative dysfunction (such as logrolling, capture by 
interest groups, unfair incumbent protection, distraction, or outright corruption), then 
special laws opinions would be dominated by close readings of legislative history as 
the court sought out the legislature’s “true” subjective purpose in passing the 
challenged law.  That task is tilting at windmills, one might argue.  To the extent that 
such a thing as legislative “intent” even exists, it can be impossible to discern from 
outside the corridors of political power.  If state constitutional framers expected their 
judges to undertake such an examination, they simply misunderstood the inherent 
limitations on the judicial role. 
However, there are doctrines that depend crucially on the judicial interpretation 
of subjective legislative intent.  When evaluating employment discrimination claims, 
for example, the McDonnell-Douglas test famously demands that courts look past 
the defendant’s superficial reasons for challenged conduct to determine whether the 
action was, in fact, motivated by race (or another protected class).136  Is a racial 
motivation any easier to distinguish from a bona fide business rationale than a 
private purpose is to distinguish from a public purpose? In McCreary County v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutional legitimacy of a so-called “Ten Commandments” display under the 
federal Establishment Clause.137 Contrary to a direct argument that the legislative 
purpose was ultimately and inherently unknowable, the Court held that the display’s 
constitutionality hinged on the state actors’ purpose.138  Justice Souter, writing for 
the Court, explained that appellate courts routinely examine subjective purpose, even 
purpose submerged beneath pretext, when evaluating the legality of challenged 
actions.139  Is it more difficult to tell whether a statute was intended as a favor for a 
major campaign contributor than whether a statute was intended to promote religion? 
 In a legal area much closer to the special laws problem than employment 
discrimination or religious establishment, the answer is yes.  In Kelo v. City of New 
London., the federal Supreme Court considered whether a government taking 
                                                            
 134 See People v. Harding, 19 N.W. 155, 156 (Mich. 1884) (Cooley, J.) (asserting that “in 
seeking for [a state constitution’s] real meaning we must take into consideration the times and 
circumstances under which the State Constitution was formed—the general spirit of the times 
and the prevailing sentiments among the people.”). 
 135 See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1464 (1982) (complaining that “the possibility that factors peculiar to the 
states may strengthen the case for judicial intervention in the economic realm has largely been 
ignored”). 
 136 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 137 See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005).  I thank 
Chris Lund for suggesting the relevance of this case to my point here. 
 138 See id. at 861. 
 139 Id. 
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satisfied the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement.140  The Court affirmed the 
theoretical principle that government may not take private property under a sham 
public purpose when its actual purpose is for private benefit.141  However, the Court 
went on to adopt an enormously deferential approach, holding that the municipality’s 
taking of private homes for transfer to a global pharmaceutical corporation was a 
sufficiently “public” purpose.142  It was impossible, Kelo held, for a court to 
rationally distinguish between economic development and any other public purpose.  
The question before the Kelo Court, whether a particular government action was 
motivated by a public or private purpose, is the same question special laws 
prohibitions seem to put to state courts.  The Supreme Court’s deferential approach 
under the Takings Clause makes a strong argument that any more meaningful review 
would be futile or overreaching.143 
The judicial desire to avoid unwarranted interference in legislative prerogatives, 
especially in the economic sphere, echoes the battle over Lochner-ism.144  Perhaps 
state courts refrain from vigorous enforcement of special laws prohibitions because 
they have been once burned and twice learned.  The judicial ideology represented by 
Lochner used the language of liberty to abandon Americans to the clutches of their 
economic oppressors.  Worse, by constitutionalizing laissez-faire economics, the 
doctrine left no escape valve for the subsequent political backlash, forcing a well-
known constitutional show-down that nearly demolished the federal Supreme 
Court’s credibility.145  The mechanics of Lochner required a close inquiry by courts 
into the actual purpose of legislation, so that populist legislatures’ dispersal of public 
goods for the private benefit of workers could be rooted out and eliminated.146  
Some of the earliest judicial efforts to suppress labor by means we would today 
call Lochnerism were, indeed, linked to state constitutional prohibitions on special 
privileges.  For example, the California Supreme Court invalidated a restriction on 
bakers’ work hours as early as 1880, on the ground that the protective statute was 
“special legislation.”147  Today’s state court judges might avoid that technique out of 
Lochner-phobia, regardless of the special laws clauses’ textual invitation to the 
contrary. 
                                                            
 140 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
 141 See id. at 478. 
 142 See id. at 482. 
 143 On the other hand, the Kelo Court noted that some states have interpreted their state 
constitutional takings clauses as necessitating a more searching inquiry into the purpose of the 
taking.  See id. at 489 n.22, citing Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) 
(invalidating a taking intended to promote economic development).  But cf. Ilya Somin, What 
if Kelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other Way?, 45 IND. L. REV. 2121, 2126 (2011) 
(arguing that state statutes intended to impose higher property protections than had Kelo had 
“little or no meaningful constraint” on takings). 
 144 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 145 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1987). 
 146 See id. 
 147 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 87 (1993), quoting Ex Parte Westerfield, 55 
Cal. 550, 551 (1880). 
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On the other hand, rather than perceiving the state constitutions’ call to expose 
and expunge private favoritism as linked to the reviled Lochner, it might be more 
plausible for state jurists to associate special laws prohibitions with the equally 
famous but much-loved Carolene Products footnote four.148  There, the federal 
Supreme Court offered the possibility that rigorous judicial review might be 
appropriate where “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”149  With this euphonious phrase, 
Justice Stone gently raised the argument that judicial review can be used to protect 
democratic functioning where the political equivalent of market failure has gummed 
up the works.  Similarly, judges might see special laws prohibitions as an invitation 
to protect democratic processes from capture by elite economic minorities.  In this 
conception of special laws clauses, vigorous judicial review is merely the mirror 
image of the heightened scrutiny courts already employ to protect disfavored 
minorities from political exclusion. In other words, where minorities face unfair 
obstacles in the legislative process, the courts will intervene; so, too, where 
minorities face unfair advantages in the legislative process, the courts should 
intervene. 
Some courts, in an effort to make sense of their special laws prohibitions, have 
paid particular attention to whether the legislative class is “closed” or not.150  A 
statute alleged to be special might, for now, apply to only one company—but if other 
firms could eventually satisfy the statutory specification, then the class is “open” and 
not special.  By contrast, if a class is defined so narrowly that no other firm could 
enter or exit the class, such as when the dates required for eligibility have passed, 
then the class is “closed” and thus prohibited.  
For example, in a recent Florida case,151 the Florida Supreme Court considered 
whether a restriction on horserace betting parks broadcasting their races to other 
betting parlors nearby amounted to a special law.  The court rested its decision 
invalidating the statute on the unlikelihood that any park could join the favored 
class.152  If there had been a “reasonable possibility” that the legislatively-defined 
class could contain other firms in the future, the court would have upheld the statute 
even though it applied to only one part of the state at the time of decision.153 
Even the analysis of “closed” versus “open” classes in special laws 
jurisprudence, which on its face seems uniquely state-focused and autonomous of 
federal influence, closely resembles the “immutable characteristics” doctrine of 
standard federal equal protection.  Under federal jurisprudence, the few classes 
                                                            
 148 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See, e.g., Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991) (“A legislative act can violate 
Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, as special legislation in one of two ways: (1) by creating a totally 
arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or (2) by creating a permanently closed 
class.”). 
 151  Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 967 So. 2d 
802 (Fla. 2007). 
 152 See id. at 809. 
 153 See id.   
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afforded heightened protection (meaning diminished judicial deference to 
legislation) are defined primarily by two elements: the members have been subject to 
a long history of de jure invidious discrimination, and the members are thought of as 
unable to escape their “immutable” membership in the class.154  
This second element has never been entirely literal, in that the courts have 
consistently protected religious identity as if it were beyond the choice of any 
individual adherent.  Scholars have recently begun to challenge the courts’ emphasis 
on immutability, arguing that subjugated classes should be protected regardless of 
whether the defining traits are immutable or not.155  Nevertheless, current doctrine 
continues to emphasize immutability as a rationale for equal protection in the courts.  
Rarely do courts attend with any seriousness to why we treat religion as if it were 
unchangeable (even if the arguments are not that hard to imagine).  
During the reign of Lochnerism, courts sometimes treated individuals’ economic 
attachments as closer to immutable.  Workers had freedom to choose any “lawful” 
profession, but once chosen, the state could only displace them for weighty reasons.  
Though couched in the language of “liberty of contract” and laissez-faire economics, 
these decisions emphasized the close connection between each worker’s identity and 
occupation.  For example, a state regulation that forced a baker to earn less or to face 
greater difficulty in finding work in that profession struck at what the courts 
assumed was a central aspect of the person’s identity, something it would be unfair 
for the state to demand the person change under economic coercion.156  Even outside 
the context of economic regulation, the courts tended to treat workers’ professional 
identity as a trait the state could only regulate under extraordinary circumstances.  In 
the famous education-law case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the federal Supreme Court 
disapproved a state statute prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign language in 
public elementary schools.157  It offered, as part of its explanation, a defense of the 
teacher’s right to his occupation free from legislative impairment:  “Plaintiff in error 
taught this language in school as part of his occupation.  His right thus to teach and 
the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within 
the liberty of the Amendment.”158   
The judicial move away from Lochnerism essentially rejected this approach.  
Instead, courts began to rule consistently with a view that the investors or workers in 
any given firm or industry are relatively free (in a practical, cultural sense rather than 
in the formal legal sense promoted by Lochner) to exit the firm or industry for other 
                                                            
 154 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 686 (1973) (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex as an immutable characteristic, subject to historic invidious discrimination, 
and typically irrelevant to job performance). 
 155 See, e.g., Susan Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495 (2009) 
(arguing that the left’s political attachment to the idea of homosexuality as immutable relates 
to the overemphasis on immutability in the federal Supreme Court’s caselaw and that equal 
protection doctrine ought instead to be concerned with human dignity). 
 156 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905) (invalidating a state statute that 
restricted the terms of bakers’ contracts), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
 157 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that the statute violated the 
federal Fourteenth Amendment). 
 158 Id. at 400. 
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areas of the economy, and therefore lack a strong right to remain in their chosen 
field.  According to the mainstream contemporary view that economic regulation 
deserves minimal judicial scrutiny, individuals’ economic attachments have lost their 
quasi-immutable sheen.  If an Oklahoma eyeglass technician finds state regulations 
to be unfavorable, she is free to become an opthalmologist—or an oil-rig worker or 
short-order cook or novelist.159  It follows, then, that legislatures are free to favor or 
disfavor economic activity so long as natural persons remain free to enter other 
business.  In this sense, whether a class is “closed” (i.e., immutable) rests on the 
fiction of corporations as legal persons more than on the literal inescapability of the 
regulated class.  
But unlike federal equal protection doctrine, which centers on the protection of 
disfavored minorities from invidious discrimination, special laws prohibitions target 
legislative favoritism.  A grant of privilege to a single firm, in terms by which no 
other firm could ever win the privilege, restricts the economic opportunity of natural 
persons more effectively than oppressive regulation of a single firm.  Whereas every 
baker unhappy with New York’s wage-and-hour laws could decide to become a 
fishmonger instead, the owners of a horseracing track are not simply free to buy 
(privately held) shares in the legislatively-privileged riverboat casino; nor would all 
the racetrack bookies be free to take up employment on the riverboat.  
Lochner upheld workers’ and investors’ right to stay in their chosen industry 
without state interference, a decision that today is near-universally condemned as an 
excessive restriction on the legislatures’ power to structure the economy and thereby 
steer workers and investors into favored sectors.  If New York’s minimum-price law 
on milk made the product too expensive for Nebbia to sell, then he was free to sell 
something else instead; storeowners simply did not have judicially enforceable rights 
to sell whatever they wanted at any price.160  If state courts perceive enforcement of 
special laws prohibitions as judicial overreaching into economic regulation in the 
manner of Lochner, they will naturally avoid it or face popular and scholarly 
critique.  However, the distinction I have described above illustrates that courts 
enforcing the “closed set” concept of special laws may not be repeating the mistakes 
of Lochner (even if there remain other objections to special laws prohibition 
enforcement).  Where Lochnerism confronted the legislature’s ability to target broad 
areas of the economy—industries or professions—for regulation, special laws 
prohibitions instead target legislative action directed at immutable economic classes 
such as a single firm.  If baking is unprofitable for employers who must pay a 
minimum wage, then they are free to invest in other industries.  But a baker who 
must compete with a rival who has been granted a legislative appropriation 
earmarked for a closed class cannot simply shift her economic allegiance to the rival 
firm.  Courts’ attentiveness to whether the legislature’s classification reasonably 
admits the possibility of entry or exit from the class thus tracks the federal equal 
protection concern with immutable characteristics.  
This reading of the special laws prohibitions highlights another, related, reason 
that one might expect more vigorous judicial enforcement than the caselaw actually 
reveals.  Special laws clauses are majoritarian.  Judicial minimalists have long 
argued that courts diminish their political capital when they invalidate popular laws 
                                                            
 159 Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a state statute requiring 
eyeglass-fitting stores to keep on site someone licensed to prescribe eyewear). 
 160 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding price-fixing statute). 
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or otherwise set themselves against the democratic institutions of government.161  
But here, if a state court concludes that the challenged legislation is special, it has 
necessarily decided that the great mass of taxpayers have been compelled to support 
some minority without any clear benefit to the public.  Judicial interventions of that 
sort, one might think, would be likely to increase rather than decrease the perceived 
popular legitimacy of the court.  After all, as Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes 
have observed, “politics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive 
behavior.”162 A court that could break through this anticompetitive behavior by 
economic minorities working in combination with political incumbents would be 
enhancing, not diminishing, the state’s democratic legitimacy.  This motivation 
ought to be especially strong where the judges are elected, as many are.163  Would 
one not expect judges to delight at the prospect of campaigning on a record of 
protecting the public from the “special interests that dominate the legislature”?164 
The skeptic’s predictable reaction is to note that if economic elites have captured 
the legislature, they might well have captured the courts, too.  Judges, especially 
elected judges, are under increasing pressure to seek office in ways indistinguishable 
from “real” politicians.165  Any state’s particular special interests likely to succeed in 
winning public benefits from the legislature are also likely to have disproportionate 
influence over the judicial selection and retention process.  Even less crassly, state 
high court judges are likely to share common cultural and ideological attitudes with 
the other members of the state’s ruling class.  They may perceive legislative 
appropriations, taxation, or regulation as having a public purpose more easily when 
they perceive the private interest as normatively desirable.  As we like to say here in 
Detroit, “what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice 
versa.”166  This difficulty with strong enforcement of special laws prohibitions 
supports the view that courts could never be completely effective at checking 
legislative capture. 
Nevertheless, perfection cannot be the standard in human endeavors.  And 
deterrence of legislative capture is not the only rationale behind the special laws 
prohibitions.  Even if judges and legislators share a common political culture, one 
might expect the judges to welcome an opportunity to impede logrolling, the 
diversion of legislative time to trivial matters, fiscal recklessness, or legislative 
                                                            
 161 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 162 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998). 
 163 See G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 291, 291 (2007) (providing statistics on the number and nature of elected and appointed 
state judges). 
 164 See generally David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2115 (2010) (describing majoritarian judicial review). 
 165 Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (describing a litigant 
who spent over $3 million in support of a candidate for state supreme court justice who then 
won office and voted in the litigant’s favor).  
 166 Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 215, 
236 n.72 (2001) (quoting Charles E. Wilson’s statement at his Senate confirmation hearing to 
become Secretary of Defense). 
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interference in conventional judicial functions.  When provided with a textual 
invitation to engage in these matters, why would state judges withdraw into the 
comforting cocoon of federal rational-basis review? 
Perhaps judicial re-examination of legislative economic classifications is too far 
outside of American judges’ role as they understand it culturally and 
psychologically.  But state high court judges commonly engage in judicial activity 
that also does not fit cleanly in the federally centered story of “what judges do.”  
Professor Helen Hershkoff compiled a magisterial exposition of state court practices 
that would range from odd to unthinkable for federal courts.167  Among these are 
advisory opinions (which are almost always extraordinary judicial interventions into 
the legislative process, frequently involving the court in an assessment of pending—
but not yet adopted—legislation), taxpayer standing (which invites judicial review of 
legislative appropriations), and the resolution of political questions.168  Though often 
forgotten in public rhetoric, it also remains true that state high courts are self-
consciously law-making institutions through their promulgation of the common 
law169 and direct legislation in subject areas like civil procedure and evidence.  These 
common practices weaken the argument that judges are culturally unequipped to 
engage in the activist review that special laws prohibitions seem to demand. 
Moreover, special laws prohibitions do confront state judges with a task 
unequivocally in the core of the judicial function: interpretation of a text. “Special” 
and “general,” “public” and “private” are all capacious terms with a broad array of 
potential meanings.  But they mean something, and judges faced with those phrases 
could reasonably be expected to make a good-faith effort at elaboration.  This highly 
positivist rationale calls on judges to worry less about the judicial role, institutional 
capacity, economic policy, and political alliances and more about what the 
constitutional command in front of them calls upon them to do.  Whatever level of 
deference the various clauses suggest, no “public meaning” understood by the voters 
who ratified these clauses170 could plausibly indicate that judges stymied by the 
interpretive puzzle should fall back to federal rational-basis review.  Yet state 
constitutionalism has never been strictly positivist (or originalist).171  
III.  THEORIES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT  
In this Part, I examine the state constitutional philosophies of leading scholars.  
The first section reviews the works of two foundational state constitutional 
positivists, Professors Robert Williams and Helen Hershkoff.  Both Williams and 
Hershkoff have developed complex and nuanced arguments for why state 
                                                            
 167 See Hershkoff, supra  note 121. 
 168 See id. at 1836-38. 
 169 See Laurence P. Claus & Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Courts as “Positive 
Legislators” in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 479-80 (2010) (noting that 
“[j]udicial lawmaking is, of course, an entirely familiar feature of common law adjudication”).  
 170 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights: 
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 413 (2009) 
(describing originalist theories of constitutional interpretation). 
 171 See James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It?: Why Federalism and Constitutional 
Positivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1247-48 (2005) (describing state 
courts’ routine unwillingness to apply positive law). 
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constitutional texts ought to be interpreted on their own terms rather than assumed to 
be equivalent to either a generic national “constitutionalism” or specifically federal 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
The second section considers the state constitutional approach advocated by 
Justice William Brennan, Professors Robert Cover and James Gardner, and Dean 
Robert Schapiro.  This approach, which I call constitutional universalism, insists that 
state constitutions be interpreted in their legal context, a context which includes a 
profoundly influential federal constitutional tradition.  To ignore federal practice in 
the interpretation of state constitutions would be both descriptively futile and 
prescriptively unwise.  Nevertheless, these scholars do favor constitutional 
pluralism.  In different ways, they each argue that state constitutions afford their 
interpreters a legal space in which to contest national constitutional values.  
Finally, in the third section of this Part, I describe the writings of Dean Daniel 
Rodriguez and Professor Jim Rossi, whose state constitutional approach I call 
“constitutional pragmatism.”  They view state constitutional interpretation as a 
matter of practical compromises derived experientially from the fine-grained factual 
circumstances facing the legal interpreter.172  Frequently, these compromises will be 
best achieved when state constitutional interpreters (courts or agencies) consciously 
pursue doctrine that permits or encourages state cooperation with federal authority. 
Having established the contours of these three schools of state constitutional 
thought in this Part, I proceed in Part IV to show how state courts’ special laws 
jurisprudence undermines the normative power of all three theories.  I argue that 
special laws clauses are not an odd corner-case that successful theories can disregard 
as marginal.  Instead, the failure of the theories described in this Part to respond 
adequately to the challenge posed by state practice in this area is a fundamental 
failure that only a new approach could address. 
A.  Constitutional Positivists 
1.  Williams 
Perhaps the state constitutionalist most closely associated with critiques of 
“lockstepping,” the unreasoned adoption of federal jurisprudence as state 
constitutional interpretation, is Professor Robert Williams.  He has carefully mapped 
a variety of subcategories of lockstepping.  These include prospective lockstepping, 
in which a state high court concludes that a particular clause of the state constitution 
shall be forever interpreted as equivalent to the federal Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of a parallel federal clause—regardless of any changes in federal 
doctrine.  For example, regardless of any differences in text, purpose, or history, a 
state court might conclude that a state constitutional clause guaranteeing the liberty 
of persons will always be read as identical to federal search-and-seizure doctrine.173  
                                                            
 172 My use of the term “pragmatism” in this way will match some definitions and depart 
from others.  See Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does the Path of Law Lead 
Us?, 3 PRAGMATISM TODAY 8, 10 (2012) (offering nineteen different widely-used definitions 
of “pragmatism”).  I use this ambiguous term with reference to Rodriguez and Rossi because 
of their emphasis on judicial interpretation that solves the problem in front of the court as a 
matter of policy and governance rather than comports with an overarching theory. 
 173 See WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 113-23.  Florida, among other states, has gone so far as 
to inscribe prospective lockstepping directly in its state constitutional text.  FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 12 (1982) (declaring that protection from unreasonable search and seizure “shall be 
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In a less rigid form of lockstepping, courts will adopt or deny federal doctrine case-
by-case.  A particular fact pattern might lead the court to treat state constitutional 
protection as no greater than the federal doctrine provides, while leaving open the 
possibility that a future case will call for interpreting the same state clause above the 
federal floor.174  Finally, a state court might also apply federal interpretive methods, 
but disagree on the ultimate result such methods produce.  In same-sex marriage 
cases, for example, both Iowa175 and Massachusetts176 purported to apply federal 
rational-basis review, but reached the opposite conclusion anticipated under federal 
jurisprudence.177  While this last approach leads to independent state constitutional 
results, it remains a form of lockstepping when the state court simply follows federal 
models of judicial reasoning without an examination or explanation of whether the 
federal model truly comports with the state constitutional text. 
Prof. Williams’s consistent attacks on these varieties of lockstepping derive from 
his insistence that courts ought to read state constitutions and interpret them as 
autonomous sources of law.  These texts satisfy the positivist definition of law as 
those rules created by processes socially recognized as law-producing.178  For 
Williams, that means that these texts and their unique histories must form the central 
focus of any legitimate effort at state constitutional interpretation.179  To disregard 
the state constitutional text in favor of generic federal doctrine is to abrogate the 
state sovereign’s law-making authority, and thereby to disempower the democratic 
polity of each state.  Lockstepping nullifies whatever political compromises or 
collective wisdom the states’ people have adopted. 
By contrast, legitimate state constitutional interpretation (in Williams’s view) 
would examine the features of each state constitution on its own terms.  If the state 
constitution protects free “expression” rather than free “speech,” Williams would 
insist that the state courts consider what the drafters meant by “expression,” not 
merely assume that the federal First Amendment occupies the field. Oregon Justice 
Hans Linde’s “primacy” approach serves as the leading example of this method180.  
2.  Hershkoff 
Professor Helen Hershkoff, like Williams, adopts a positivist approach to state 
constitutions in the sense that she urges state courts to give effect to their 
constitutional texts, even if to do so would depart from national norms outside the 
                                                                                                                                            
construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court”). 
 174 See id. 
 175 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (purportedly applying federal-
style rational basis review but invalidating the state ban on same-sex marriage). 
 176 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (same). 
 177 Cf. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (dismissing a same-sex marriage claim 
for want of a “substantial” federal question). 
 178 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 15 (1961). 
 179 See Jim Rossi, Book Review, Assessing the State of State Constiutionalism, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1145, 1149-50 (2011) (describing Williams as a legal positivist). 
 180 See Linde, supra note 125.  
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state constitutions.181  In a series of path-breaking works, she argues that state 
constitutions contain a variety of textual and structural features that diverge from the 
federal Constitution and its interpretive tradition.  For her, the presence of these 
features requires that state courts adopt a different role from the rigidly constrained 
practice of federal courts.  For example, because state constitutions commonly 
contain so-called “positive” rights that require legislative action for fulfillment, such 
as the right to education, right to welfare, right to public health, or the right to a 
protected environment, Hershkoff argues that state courts should actively oblige the 
legislatures to execute these provisions.  The standard federal rationales for judicial 
minimalism—Bickel’s182 “passive virtues”—simply do not apply in the distinct 
constitutional universe of state law, Hershkoff demonstrates. Instead, features of 
state judiciaries like the power to make common law or the election of judges leave 
state courts a responsibility to assume a greater role in state governance.  
For Hershkoff, state courts that decline to exercise this responsibility by 
lockstepping or by embracing federal courts’ cramped view of judicial power, as too 
many do, fail their states.  Crucial to her arguments along these lines is Hershkoff’s 
view that state constitutions, as positive law, are independently worthy of 
interpretation.  If Texas has a right to education in its state constitution but the 
federal Constitution does not, legal doctrine should reflect the difference and actual 
cases should come out differently.  If state courts are empowered to routinely make 
common law but federal courts are not, legal doctrine should likewise reflect the 
difference.  Merely to assume that these textual or structural differences are 
meaningless and that the state courts are free to mimic federal jurisprudence without 
further examination is, for Hershkoff, a grave abdication of the courts’ 
responsibility.  Descriptively, Hershkoff has documented extensively state courts’ 
failure to meet this responsibility in a wide variety of doctrinal areas.  Prescriptively, 
she argues, this failure denigrates the law-giving democratic authority of the people 
who ratified each state constitution. 
B.  Constitutional Universalists 
1.  Brennan 
By 1977, as the Warren Court’s attention to equality and rights protection waned, 
Justice William Brennan found himself increasingly in dissent.  Frustrated by the 
futility of dissents that were less and less persuasive to the Burger-led majority, 
Brennan did what so many people do when seeking to make a bigger influence on 
the real world than was possible at work: he wrote a law review article.  His piece, 
published in the Harvard Law Review under the title State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights,183 was dominated by a single insight.  Brennan 
realized that he had friends in low places.  Perhaps because of his prior service on 
the New Jersey Supreme Court (still one of the most highly regarded in the country), 
Brennan remembered that state high courts could carry on the civil rights agenda 
even if Brennan’s colleagues on “The Court” would not.   
                                                            
 181 See generally Hershkoff, supra note 121. 
 182 See generally Bickel, supra note 161. 
 183 Brennan, supra note 123.  
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Brennan’s article was not entirely original, since a 1970 piece184 by Hans Linde 
had already detailed the potential for state courts to use their state constitutions for 
more rights-protective criminal procedure.  Nor was the article entirely developed; 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights is barely more than a 
skeleton on which Brennan hung string citations.  First, he presented a mountain of 
footnotes showing that the federal Supreme Court was retreating from its prior 
approach to rights protection.  Then, he matched it with a similar pile of footnotes 
showing that state high courts had sometimes adopted higher standards of rights 
protection.  He concluded, rather axiomatically, that we need more of the latter until 
we get less of the former.  Nor was the article entirely friendly to state courts, in that 
Brennan viewed them strictly instrumentally, as tools to effectuate the jurisprudence 
he described in his dissents.  
Despite its flaws, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights was 
strikingly influential.  LexisNexis reports that it has been cited more than two 
hundred times by state courts, and scholars of state constitutions typically credit 
Brennan with provoking state courts to begin the New Judicial Federalism 
revolution.  Every origin myth deserves investigation, and the view of federalism 
represented by Brennan’s article rewards a close reading.  Two features stand out: 
Brennan’s implication that state constitutional jurisprudence appropriately changes 
in reaction to the work of the federal Supreme Court, and his implication that the text 
of state constitutions would not stand as a serious obstacle for state judges eager to 
carry out a larger, national jurisprudential agenda.  
We might begin with surprise that Brennan wrote at all as an advocate for 
vigorous state constitutionalism.  After all, his opinions on the federal high court 
never displayed an overweening regard for states’ rights.  But in effect, his article 
was consistent with that federal-centered approach.  By calling upon state high 
courts to adjust their interpretations of their own constitutions in response to shifts in 
federal jurisprudence, Brennan maintained the federal Supreme Court as the 
epicenter of American constitutionalism.  His article positions state constitutions as 
essentially fungible, with just enough legitimacy to support a state high court’s 
rights-protective program but not so much that their textual differences might stand 
as a positive restraint on judicial activism.  As early as this foundational work, then, 
we see the foreshadowing of the view that the state and federal high courts engage in 
dialogue to develop national norms of liberty and equality, coupled with a non-
positivist approach to state constitutionalism. 
2.  Cover  
Meanwhile, also in 1977, Professor Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff 
published an examination of the habeas corpus device in criminal procedure.185  At 
the time Cover and Aleinikoff were writing, habeas corpus jurisprudence invited 
federal courts to review state convictions de novo for federal constitutional 
                                                            
 184 Hans Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 
125 (1970) (calling for state constitutional interpretive autonomy).  See generally Robert F. 
Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. vii, xiii (1996) (describing the early history of New Judicial Federalism).  
 185 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 128. 
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violations.186  In light of the relative success of equity in remedying the civil rights 
violations of the 1950s and 1960s, an observer might have expected the Warren 
Court to approach criminal procedure with a similar willingness to engage in reform 
by injunction.  Instead, the Court expanded the previously unusual use of collateral 
review to bring state criminal trial procedures into compliance with the newly 
articulated constitutional requirements (e.g., Miranda or Gideon requirements).  In 
Cover and Aleinikoff’s account, this practice led to what they called “dialectical 
federalism,” a necessary conversation between state and federal courts about 
constitutional values.187   
Where the federal Supreme Court had not yet defined the specific contours of a 
constitutional right, like whether the right to counsel applied to parole or probation 
revocation, state courts had open interpretive space to reach their own conclusions 
about the meaning of the federal Sixth Amendment (and the Supreme Court 
precedents interpreting it).  Because the federal courts would use habeas to review 
these state court interpretations de novo, the federal judges also had formal authority 
to establish their own views of the federal requirement.  If the federal courts reached 
a more rights-protective conclusion than the state courts, then they would free the 
state prisoners on habeas writs (or order retrials).  Even so, if the state courts were 
willing to pay that price, they were not formally bound to follow the federal courts’ 
view in the absence of a Supreme Court resolution of the dispute.  Federal district 
courts and courts of appeals cannot bind state courts to their view of federal law.  
As a result, some federal circuits adopted liberal constructions of the right at 
stake while the state courts persisted in applying a narrower standard; other federal 
circuits adopted strict standards on habeas review even where at least some states in 
their circuits had adopted a more liberal construction for themselves.  Both state and 
federal courts confronted with these issues frequently cited each other for persuasive 
reasoning, and different theories shuttled around across the country, crossing state-
federal boundaries along the way.  Ultimately, as in a Bickelian dream come true, the 
federal Supreme Court weighed the different state and federal approaches that had 
developed while it was waiting to reach the issues, and then based its dispositive 
holding on a combination of state and federal judicial values. 
In the criminal procedure setting Cover and Aleinikoff examined, both the state 
courts and lower federal courts were interpreting the same source of law, the federal 
Constitution, and both judiciaries were formally bound by holdings of the 
Constitution’s definitive expositor, the federal Supreme Court.  State constitutions 
offer a different set of possibilities by providing state courts with a different source 
of law to apply (to the same fact patterns otherwise governed by federal law) and 
with an expanded formal capacity to deviate not just from the lower federal courts 
but also from the federal Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, the dialectical federalism 
Cover and Aleinikoff described, the obligatory and productive interaction between 
state and federal judiciaries to develop a more richly nuanced understanding of 
rights, serves as an important precursor to contemporary state constitutional theory. 
                                                            
 186 Cf. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996) (a federal statute establishing a highly deferential standard of review for 
collateral attacks on state criminal convictions).  
 187 Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 128, at 1046. 
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3.  Schapiro on Polyphonic Federalism 
Dean Robert Schapiro built on the dialectical federalism concept in his book 
Polyphonic Federalism.188  Schapiro examined the phenomenon of “intersystemic 
adjudication,” the interpretation of federal law in state courts and state law in federal 
courts.189  While Cover and Aleinikoff were concerned with the loss of federal court 
supervision over state court interpretation of federal law, their description of 
dialectical federalism directly conflicts with “dual spheres” federalism, the primary 
target of Schapiro’s book.  Dual spheres federalism seeks to divide state and federal 
authority according to substantive areas of law.  Education, family law, criminal 
justice, and land use would thus fall within exclusive state control, while interstate 
economic regulation, civil rights, and environmental protection would fall within 
exclusive federal control.  In the judicial context, dual spheres federalism 
acknowledges concurrent state-federal jurisdiction as a perhaps-necessary but better-
avoided allocation of jurisdiction.  Diversity jurisdiction should be limited or 
eliminated, while removal of federally significant cases should be encouraged.  
Schapiro’s work opposes this approach to federalism, arguing that “polyphony” is a 
better metaphor, both descriptively and prescriptively.  In polyphonic federalism, 
both state and federal courts share subject matter jurisdiction over the widest array of 
laws.  
Schapiro’s concept of polyphony differs from Cover in two significant respects.  
Although Cover’s approach rejected dual spheres federalism with respect to courts 
and legal interpreters, he still maintained a relatively robust view of the distinction 
between state and federal law.  This view that makes sense in light of Cover’s 
commitment to civil rights190 and the work federal law was still doing in this area in 
the 1970s.  In contrast, Schapiro views state and federal law as blended together 
more thoroughly than did Cover, and he prizes the multiple interpreters of both state 
and federal law in part because he views those interpretations as mutually influential.  
Through his metaphor of polyphony, Schapiro also emphasizes the simultaneity of 
multiple interpretations (as instruments play over each other in an orchestra) in 
contrast to Cover’s use of the term “dialectic,” which implies a series of exchanges 
between partners like a tennis match.  These distinctions make Schapiro even more 
of a universalist than Cover in the interpretation of state constitutions because the 
polyphony notion prioritizes the way judicial interpretations fit with (or against) 
each other on a national scale, with less regard for the geographic or political source 
of any given legal text. 
4.  Gardner on Interactive Federalism 
After Failed Discourse detailed the ways that state constitutionalism does not 
comport with conventional understandings of constitutional interpretation, Professor 
James Gardner turned his attention to developing an interpretive theory for state 
constitutions that better describes state courts’ actual practice.  His book Interpreting 
                                                            
 188 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 23 (2009). 
 189 Id. at 122. 
 190 See Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat, Preface, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE 
AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER ix-x (1993) (describing Cover’s civil rights 
activism). 
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State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System191 asked state 
constitutional scholars and judges to stop forcing state constitutional interpretation 
into a theoretical mold it does not fit, and instead to devise a theory that describes 
and justifies state constitutionalism in light of the purpose those documents play in 
our national federal system.  In taking on this project, Gardner “move[d] beyond” 
positivist interpretation of constitutional text in favor of a context-driven broad 
approach.192  Romantic subnationalism, the idea that the people of each state are a 
normatively autonomous polity with unique values and cultural traits,193 simply does 
not withstand examination.  Gardner suggests that state constitutional court judges 
know this, intuitively or explicitly, and that is why he finds them so frequently 
dispensing with autonomous analysis or blending federal values and positive law 
into state constitutional jurisprudence.    
If state constitutions do not reflect the deepest values of the unique people of 
each state, what is left to guide their interpreters?  Gardner argues that state 
constitutions play a crucial role in the federal system.  He focuses on the metaphor of 
the American people as a sovereign with government as their agent.  In the original 
federal Plan of the Convention, the people divided their allegiance between state and 
federal governments to check each other and protect the people’s liberty.  This is 
hardly a radical account of either democratic government or of federalism, but in 
Gardner’s hands the principal-agent model took on special significance.  Gardner 
describes state constitutions as reflecting a balance of three political impulses among 
Americans: trust/mistrust for the federal government as a balance against states; 
trust/mistrust for state government as a balance against the federal government; and 
trust/mistrust for government at any level as a balance against private power.  As a 
national constitutional community, Americans have employed federalism so that 
these balances can be allocated differently across state lines.  For Gardner, the 
crucial distinction between this form of balancing and Romantic subnationalism (i.e., 
conventional state constitutionalism) is that the values and goals animating this 
process are national in scope.  The American people are the smallest coherent 
political community, in his account, and they delegate their sovereignty 
competitively between the state and federal governments somewhat like Richard 
Nixon’s presidential management technique of assigning the same task to two 
different teams, letting each compete for his approval.194 
Some state constitutions, therefore, exhibit what Gardner describes as a high 
degree of trust in the federal government.  These documents share features like a 
weak, vague, or non-existent bill of individual rights; formally empowered 
judiciaries with Hershkoff-style195 vigorous judicial review, capable of using federal 
law to check state institutions; divided or weak executive power; and procedural or 
substantive limitations on legislative power.  The combination of few rights clauses 
                                                            
 191 JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 117 (2005). 
 192 Jim Rossi, Book Review, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211, 215 
(2006) (reviewing GARDNER, supra note 191). 
 193 GARDNER supra note 191, at 53-54. 
 194 See Richard Neustadt, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 113 (1991). 
 195 See Hershkoff, supra note 121, at 1870 (arguing for aggressive state court review of 
legislation). 
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/8
2012] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS 757 
 
that could provide greater liberty than the federal Fourteenth Amendment with weak 
state institutions that lack power to resist federal government activity equate, for 
Gardner, to a popular choice to trust federal power over state power.   
This set of arrangements differs from a more libertarian distrust for both layers of 
American government primarily by virtue of the bill of rights.  Where the 
constitution that privileges federal power weakens both state institutions and state 
protections of individual rights, the libertarian constitution weakens state institutions 
(again through impediments to legislative action, division and restraint in executive 
power, and judicial power sufficient to check the branches of state government) 
while simultaneously providing expansive individual rights (permitting state courts 
to protect people from both federal and state overreaching).   
Gardner’s third set reflects a greater trust for the state government than federal 
government, and a greater trust in governmental than in private power.  The 
constitutions drawn from this perspective include relatively weak individual rights 
against the state (but might include enforceable rights against private forces); strong, 
vigorous executive powers; few substantive restrictions or procedural speed-bumps 
on the plenary power of state legislatures; and a relatively weak state judiciary not 
well-suited to blocking state government initiative. 
In describing these various allocations of popular trust, Gardner notes that they 
are likely to change over time as well as across space.  When the federal government 
has taken the more prominent role in achieving nationally popular goals, such as 
civil rights enforcement in the 1960s, state constitutions are likely to reflect an 
increased respect for federal power and a corresponding weakening of state 
institutions.  Inversely, when state governments seem more active in achieving 
national goals, state constitutions are likely to allocate increased flexibility and 
power to the most energetic state branches.  And moments or places dominated by 
trust in private power but disdain for governmental power will be marked by state 
constitutions meant to hobble state government but protect individual rights.   
The idea that state constitutions contain features to frustrate state government 
from achieving legislative and executive aims is often lost in judicial and scholarly 
discussion of state constitutions.  For Gardner, this is a central purpose of the 
documents, because impairing state government is always understood in the context 
of Americans’ relationship with the federal government and private power.  Active 
and strong state governments are better suited to resist federal initiative, such as by 
structuring state agencies to make cooperation with their federal counterparts more 
difficult or by adopting policies at odds with federal goals (even where that 
discrepancy means a loss of federal funding).  Weak state governments are more 
dependent on the federal government or private institutions for both policy initiative 
and funding support.  Gardner specifically identifies a variety of state constitutional 
features intended to hamper state legislative and executive branches, including term 
limits, legislative-session limits, bill title and single-subject limits, taxation limits, 
and most pertinently, prohibitions on special laws.  Gardner identifies special laws 
prohibitions as a good example of how Americans divide power among their agents: 
these clauses hamper the legislature from achieving its policy aims in the manner it 
deems best, while also empowering the judiciary to monitor and restrain private 
power when it starts to dominate public deliberation.  This arrangement reflects 
diminished trust in state government and private power, leaving greater political 
space for the federal government to act.    
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
758 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:719 
 
C.  Constitutional Pragmatists 
1.  Rodriguez 
Dean Daniel Rodriguez, like Gardner, is interested in state constitutional failure. 
In his limpidly titled piece, State Constitutional Failure, Rodriguez looks at the 
onslaught of practical problems confronting state governments and describes a need 
to consider the effectiveness of state constitutions as rules for governance.196  
Rodriguez describes successful constitutions as those that empower the multiple 
components of state government to solve real problems, while failed state 
constitutions are those that establish institutional obstacles to effective pragmatic 
governance.197  This approach is somewhat positivist, to the extent it encourages 
state constitutional interpreters to reject blind lockstepping and consider the state’s 
own “distinct principles of how to structure the processes of government, and how to 
allocate to legislative and executive institutions the powers of governance.”198  But 
Rodriguez’s focus on effective governance also contains a thread of universalism, in 
that Rodriguez does not call for state constitutional theorists to explicate fifty 
different theories of interpretation; he urges the use of political theory to describe 
and advance best practices that would fit problems common to states across the 
country.199 
In line with his focus on the practical political girders underlying constitutions, 
Rodriguez describes state constitutionalism as a combination of “incentive-
compatible” and “incentive-incompatible” rules; the former, like a rule of judicial 
interpretation honoring legislative history, lubricate political compromise and 
encourage elected officials to take action.200  The latter, like a balanced budget 
amendment, slow or block politicians from achieving their policy aims as easily as 
they would prefer.201  Both types of rules, in a highly functioning constitution, reflect 
“high fidelity”—a close fit between the governance structures created by the 
constitution, the policy outcomes those structures promote, and the will of the 
people.202 But for state constitutions to succeed as “hi-fi” law, they must cleanly 
translate the popular will expressed through social movements and the like into legal 
structures that in reality carry out this will through governance. Rodriguez’s 
                                                            
 196 Rodriguez, supra note 124, at 1244; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional 
Theory and its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 272 (1998) (describing state constitutional 
theory as “barren”). 
 197 See Rodriguez, supra note 124, at 1246-47 see also Rodriguez, supra note 196, at 273 
(“A principal role [of state constitutions] is the facilitation of strategies of intrastate 
governance, and, in particular, the design of intrastate institutional mechanisms that enable 
differentiated local communities to flourish economically, politically, and socially.”). 
 198 See Rodriguez, supra note 196, at 273. 
 199 See Rodriguez, supra note 124, at 1247-54 (outlining features common to all successful 
constitutions). 
 200 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Change that Matters: An Essay on State Constitutional 
Development, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2011). 
 201 See id. 
 202 See id. at 1080-81 (describing “high fidelity” constitutionalism as that which 
“minimizes political noise and distortion” where the metaphorical master recording is the 
popular will and the metaphorical reproduction is the ultimate adoption of policy). 
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sustained attention to this problem offers a label but does not solve the theoretical 
problem posed by the highly distorted jurisprudence surrounding special laws 
prohibitions, which bears almost no resemblance to the political agenda of the 
popular movements that birthed those clauses. The caselaw around these clauses is 
so low-fi as to be indecipherable. 
2.  Rossi 
Professor Jim Rossi shares Rodriguez’s practical perspective on state 
constitutions.  Rossi uses his administrative law expertise to analyze how state 
constitutions create or fail to create institutional structures that promote effective 
governance.  For example, Rossi has written about state constitutional separation-of-
powers impediments to the effective exercise of gubernatorial power during crises,203 
state constitutional non-delegation impediments to effective state implementation of 
federal programs,204 and state constitutional obstacles to interstate cooperation 
toward shared policy goals.205  From his study of state constitutions’ role in policy 
development and execution, Rossi concludes that state constitutional interpreters 
should neither assume that the state constitution incorporates federal doctrine nor 
that it exists autonomously independent of the nationwide legal currents swirling 
around it.  Rossi, therefore, is neither wholly universalist nor wholly positivist.206  
His theory encourages state constitutional drafters and interpreters to pursue the 
policies that would work best to solve state problems, even if that means adopting 
strained interpretations of the constitutional text.207  At the same time, Rossi 
appreciates a role for state courts as enforcers of constitutional bargains between the 
people and their government, so that he supports courts’ effort to block legislative 
efforts to hide or escape political responsibility for the elected officials’ policy 
choices.208 
IV.  NON-ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIAL LAWS CLAUSES AS A  
PROBLEM FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
On balance, despite the reasons why state courts could or should give teeth to 
their special laws clauses, there is no hint that the courts are headed in that direction.  
So we have constitutional text that: (1) specifically derives from two distinct 
historical mass movements to regulate economic classifications; (2) expressly 
authorizes judicial review; (3) lacks any semantic relationship with any part of the 
federal constitution; and (4) targets political failures leading to corrupt 
antimajoritarian legislation, yet is ultimately insufficient to persuade state courts to 
                                                            
 203 See Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 238 (2006). 
 204 See Jim Rossi, Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired 
Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2005). 
 205 See Jim Rossi, Essay, Constitutional Isolationism and the Limits of State Separation of 
Powers as a Barrier to Interstate Compacts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 721 (2007). 
 206 See JAMES A. GARDNER & JIM ROSSI, NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 17 (2010). 
 207 See Rossi, supra note 204, at 1374-80 (describing the normative concerns around state 
constitutional interpretation that blocks effective policy choices). 
 208 See id. 
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engage in meaningful judicial review.  If the central purpose of a constitution is to 
maximize the principal’s control over its agents (the public over its officials), as 
some commentators argue,209 then what is left for the sovereign People to do when 
state constitutions fail?  
Certainly, the perception remains that elected officials are using their legislative 
powers to aid powerful economic interests at the public’s expense.  One recent poll 
determined that 74% of Americans believe that government policy has helped big 
banks, while 27% believe that policy has benefitted the middle class.210  States 
continue to appropriate public resources for narrow corporate profit.211 Even federal 
earmarks, like a grant of roughly $1.6 million to General Electric followed shortly 
after by corporate contributions to the representative who submitted the request, 
continue to undermine popular confidence in government.212  Many of us might 
prefer the small-bore corruption associated with today’s restrained judicial review 
rather than risk a return to the reactionary judicial war on workers of the 1910s and 
’20s.  But what if most voters still like the idea of courts acting as a check on 
legislative gifts to private companies?  Are the existing state constitutional clauses 
doomed forever to dead-letter status? 
Neither the positivist, nor the universalist, nor the pragmatic state constitutional 
scholarship detailed above in Part IV adequately answers the democratic deficit 
challenge posed by the courts’ inability to enforce special laws prohibitions.  For the 
positivists like Williams and Hershkoff, special laws clauses are the strongest 
possible example of state constitutional text that courts should interpret 
autonomously.  All of the conventional indicators of legal interpretation—text, 
history, structure, purpose, ratification context, even political context—deviate 
sharply from anything in the federal Constitution and point toward interpretation free 
from federal influence. Strong judicial enforcement would be majoritarian, by 
denying private elites their unwarranted privileges, and elected judiciaries should be 
more willing to embrace that result.  Similarly, enforcement would be democracy-
protective in the Carolene Products sense because it would help to insulate the 
political machinery from capture by private interests and the consequent cementing 
of incumbent advantage.  If all of these factors together still leave state courts 
applying explicitly federal “rational basis” review without analysis, then the 
positivists’ normative theories lose their mooring in actual constitutional practice.213  
                                                            
 209 See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 
1587 (2010) (arguing that the relationship between state and federal constitutions and the 
structure of state constitutions evolved to maximize the efficient control of government by the 
people). 
 210 Dana Milbank, Massey Energy’s Blankenship: No Shame, but Plenty of Blame, WASH. 
POST, July 25, 2010, at A17. 
 211 See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The Monopoly Myth: A Comment on the Public Funding of 
Sports, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 267, 267 n.3 (2009) (observing that Louisiana makes 
direct cash payments from public funds to its two private, for-profit professional sports 
teams). 
 212 See Eric Lipton & Ron Nixon, Companies Find Ways to Bypass Ban on Earmarks, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1. 
 213 For support for the principle that theories of constitutional interpretation ought to be 
measured against what real-world judges do with their constitutions, see Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 562 (1999) (arguing that 
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Hershkoff, in particular, has written extensively about the gap between how state 
courts actually decide constitutional cases—often according to federal precepts—and 
how they should ground their decisions in their often-distinctive state constitutional 
texts.  Hershkoff’s prescriptive arguments on this point are hard to refute, and I 
would not wish to.  But ultimately prescriptive theories that rely on constitutional 
text (rather than universalist “values” or customs) lose some persuasiveness if courts 
persist in ignoring those texts. Special laws clauses, I have suggested, are perhaps 
the best and strongest state constitutional text that should warrant autonomous 
interpretation.  If even here, courts cannot refrain from treating the texts as irrelevant 
by comparison to familiar federal doctrine, no matter how persuasive the positivists’ 
normative arguments might be, the special laws jurisprudence demonstrates that state 
courts simply do not reliably treat their constitutions as positive law.  Continuing to 
urge courts to do so on the basis of their texts, then, and developing ever more 
refined, thoughtful, well-researched reasons to do so, seems a bit like taking a 
foreign language speaker’s incomprehension as a signal to speak more loudly. 
Even worse for the positivists, these clauses might ultimately be incapable of an 
interpretation more coherent than the courts have so far applied.  The special laws 
prohibitions, although conceptually quite distinct from the federal Equal Protection 
Clause, are ultimately a species of equality law.  As the foundational piece on 
equality by Tussman and ten Broek reminds us, equality questions will always boil 
down to a substantive assessment of the standard against which the “equal” 
classification is measured: in other words, “equal” with respect to what?214  Can a 
consistent explanation be found that distinguishes between “privilege” for one class 
or “burden” for the other; between a classification “relevant” to the class over all and 
an “irrelevant” classification; or even between a “private” purpose and a “public” 
purpose?  If these distinctions are not evident on the face of the text, are the judges 
of any court capable of looking behind the statutory text to legislators’ multiple 
purposes, and identifying whether the corrupt outweighs the noble?  If judges’ 
interpretive tools cannot coherently draw meaning from these clauses, as the caselaw 
suggests, then the special laws prohibitions demonstrate that state constitutions’ 
accessibility to popular reform has led to “law” incapable of effect.215  Positivists 
face a paradox if a text created by the regular procedures socially sanctioned for law-
creating cannot intelligibly be interpreted as law. 
Some courts, as I have described, do attempt to enforce their prohibitions on 
special laws.  These attempts, though, remain in such logical disarray that no 
legislator, advocate, or citizen would be able to confidently predict whether a given 
law would survive judicial review.  Predictability is only one virtue of law, of 
course, and perhaps these cases provoke enough uncertainty in the legislatures to 
disincentivize private law-making.  The number of enforcement cases is so small, 
however, and the pressure on legislators from elite economic forces is so strong, that 
it seems more likely business continues as usual. In the majority of states that simply 
                                                                                                                                            
theories should be evaluated according to the results they are likely to produce and the kind of 
judicial behavior they are likely to encounter). 
 214 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. 
L. REV. 341, 357 (1949).  
 215 Cf. Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606-07 
(1986) (arguing that what distinguishes law from literature is the law’s inherent, even if latent, 
capability to legitimate and to cause action in the real world: specifically, violence). 
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do not attempt enforcement, captured legislatures need not fear these constitutional 
clauses. 
The failure to enforce special law prohibitions, assuming they are capable of 
enforcement, also presents a major problem for the universalists.  As Professor Reva 
Siegel has argued extensively, the normative legitimacy of any constitution depends 
on the public’s engagement with it.216  As she explains, “Popular engagement in 
constitutional deliberation sustains the democratic authority of original acts of 
constitutional lawmaking and supplements constitutional lawmaking as a source of 
the Constitution's democratic authority.”217  The special laws example provides a 
case where an important social problem (legislative corruption leading to fiscal ruin) 
was addressed by mass social movements (first the Populists, then the Progressives) 
through direct amendment of the state constitutions: paradigmatic constitutional 
engagement.  Clearly, the constitutional activists believed that exercising their 
authority over the constitution would bind their legislators and judges.  But when the 
activists went home, the constitutional text they had written lost its power.  The 
federal Constitution filled the void.  
For constitutional universalists Cover and Schapiro, the music of 
constitutionalism is polyphony.  American constitutionalism is richest—most 
legitimate, most democratic, most useful, most important—when multiple legal 
spaces exist for popular and professional debate over constitutional meaning.  This 
polyphony depends on a genuine federalism.218  State polities must be free to pursue 
constitutional goals in harmony with, or even at odds with, federal practice.  
Lockstepping, however frustrating it might be to scholars, can frequently match 
popular will, as when a court treats its search-and-seizure clause as equivalent to the 
federal jurisprudence in a tough-on-crime state.  In the special laws context, though, 
the citizens clearly addressed themselves to a problem they perceived as distinct 
from federal problems and offered a solution they believed particular to the states.  
When the judges adopted federal practice instead of the state law in front of them, 
the universalists’ polyphony became an orchestra of a few state penny-whistles 
amidst twenty-nine federal trombones.  
Even the universalist theory most comfortably adapted to state courts’ adoption 
of federal principles for interpretation of their own constitutions, Gardner’s theory of 
interactive federalism,219 depends on the ability of the public to change their state 
constitutions when sufficiently motivated.  For state courts to fulfill their interactive 
role as a competitor for the people’s loyalty and a bulwark for the people’s liberty, 
they must be subject to clear constitutional commands by the people.  Gardner 
describes a federalism in which people distrustful of private economic oppression 
                                                            
 216 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1343 (2006). 
 217 Id. 
 218 But cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 24 (2008) (arguing that American government is merely decentralized 
administration, not a true federalism of locally diverse values). 
 219 See Brennan, supra note 123, at 489 (Brennan’s approach to state constitutions, like 
Gardner’s, invited state courts to interpret their constitutions in light of federal caselaw and to 
agree or disagree with U.S. Supreme Court holdings as they saw fit.  Brennan never 
elaborated the normative or functional justification for this counter-intuitive practice, but 
because Gardner has, I address only Gardner’s theory in the text. 
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can empower their states and federal governments to protect them.  In other states, or 
at other historical moments, people might distrust their state governments but trust 
the federal government, or vice-versa; or they might wish to weaken both state and 
federal governments in favor of the leading economic forces.  The people give effect 
to these constantly shifting allegiances, Gardner believes, by using state constitutions 
to alter both their protection for individual rights and the structure of their state 
government.220  Notably, this account depends on a close link between the shifting 
affections of the people and matching shifts in the willingness of their judges to 
apply or to resist federal doctrine.  But the story of special laws prohibitions 
demonstrates that sometimes the levers of power the people pull are no longer 
connected to the gears of state.  Like an elevator passenger repeatedly pushing the 
pointless “Close Doors” button, the people of the states have repeatedly tried to 
arrange their state governments to protect them from economic abuse by private 
capture of the legislatures.  The people have shown no confidence that the federal 
government is capable of satisfying this responsibility.221  
Gardner’s theory of interactive federalism suggests that people can mitigate their 
dissatisfaction by making constitutional adjustments.  A major strength of this theory 
is that it sidesteps the normative primacy vs. lockstep debate in favor of an accurate 
description of how state courts interpret their constitutions while constantly 
conscious of the overarching federal constitutionalism.  The special laws cases 
amply demonstrate this feature of interactive federalism; as demonstrated above, the 
courts habitually employ federal standards (explicitly or implicitly) to interpret 
clauses that on their surface look nothing like any federal constitutional provision.  
The meaning of “equal protection jurisprudence” is thus the subject of a perpetual 
conversation between state and federal courts as each makes accommodations or 
incursions on the others’ articulation of American equality norms.  Similarly, the 
historical evidence is persuasive that the federal courts’ rejection of Lochner was 
strongly influential on the state courts’ willingness to engage in meaningful review 
of economic discrimination.  Gardner’s theory accounts for all of this.  But the next 
step is missing.   
When the people overhear this constitutional discourse among courts, interactive 
federalism theory supposes that the ordinary citizens will lend their authority more 
freely to the level of government that better suits the popular understanding of 
equality.  To do this, they must engage in political action. In its softer forms, this 
action could be informal expressions like letters to the editor, rallies, or 
campaigning.  More formally, state constitutional amendment or judicial election 
challenges stand as the strong methods of popular constitutionalism, expressing to 
the judges and public officials where the people stand on the constitutional question 
under discussion.  But interactive federalism theory lacks a descriptive or normative 
response for when the interactive discourse has become so unmoored from the text 
that the people can no longer shift their authority in favor of or against their chosen 
                                                            
 220 See GARDNER, supra note 191. 
 221 See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Megan Thee-Brenan, New Poll Finds a Deep Distrust of 
Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1 (reporting that just nine percent of Americans 
approved of Congress’s performance). 
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institutions, because the judiciary persists regardless of how directly the people 
command otherwise.222  
At first glance, the pragmatists seem least discomfited by the states’ special laws 
jurisprudence.  If legislatures are trying to achieve practical objectives and courts 
look beyond the constitutional text to authorize the legislative methods, pragmatists 
might see a well-functioning judiciary.  Pragmatists of this vein would rejoice, for 
example, at the federal Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo,223 knowing that New 
London’s plan to give the taken land to a major pharmaceutical company was the 
city’s best chance at meaningful economic development (regardless of how much it 
looked like a corporate giveaway).  This approach works well, in the sense that the 
branches of state government function cooperatively and effectively to accomplish 
short-term majoritarian policy aims. The constitution’s dead hand does not strangle 
living politicians.  Both Rossi and Rodriguez call for greater cooperation between 
branches of state government and between the states and the federal government as 
the states carry out federal policy. 
Nevertheless, Rodriguez in particular has emphasized that constitutional judicial 
review requires the courts to protect the institutional arrangements of democratic 
government so that the state’s policymaking can maintain its normative legitimacy 
and efficiency.224  In circumstances where the legislature has not enacted “good” 
public policy because it has been captured by narrowly private economic forces, 
there is nothing pragmatic about judicial acquiescence.  Prohibitions on special laws 
were intended to be both populist and good-governance measures, providing 
democratic accountability and restraining the legislatures from inefficient policy 
choices.  In practice, courts have shown themselves incapable of fulfilling this role 
as assigned by their constitutions.  The pragmatists’ call to work cooperatively for 
effective policies does nothing to address this gap between the pragmatists’ goals—
democracy and effective policy—and the inability of the courts to carry out their role 
with respect to those goals.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
From a positivist perspective, it is hard to imagine what different language the 
populist framers could have adopted in the 1840s and 50s (or the progressive framers 
in the 1870s-90s) that would have better expressed their will to the state courts.  Yet 
the jurisprudential effect has been nearly the same as if the people had adopted the 
exact text of the federal Fourteenth Amendment, a text directed at an entirely 
different evil.  With few exceptions, state high courts simply ignore the 
constitutional text.  As a result, state constitutional special laws prohibitions, no 
matter how desperately desired by state framers, lack the normative power to restrain 
the legislatures from anti-majoritarian legislation.  
                                                            
 222 Special laws prohibitions are far from the only area where state constitutional text has 
lost its link to judicial interpretation.  See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 20 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 149 (2012) (describing how judicial enforceability of state 
constitutional education obligations has no discernable relationship to the strength or 
weakness of the constitutional texts). 
 223 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 471 (2005) (upholding the “public use” 
of a municipal taking that had the effect of transferring property from one private party to 
another). 
 224 See supra Part III. 
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Many state constitutionalists are not strongly positivist, recognizing instead that 
the state constitutional texts exist in a thick context of federal constitutional law.  For 
these universalists, the toothless jurisprudence of special laws prohibitions poses a 
different challenge. Instead of state constitutions serving as a foil for a trans-
American constitutionalism—a site where constitutional values can have formal 
space to compete for national prominence—the special laws cases demonstrate just 
how cramped this conversation has become. Professor Alan Tarr’s recent work on 
terminology is very helpful here.  He defines “sub-national constitutional space” as 
the formal gap in a federal constitution that leaves room for sub-federal units like 
states to arrange their own internal institutions and to carry out governmental 
roles.225  The formal space available to American states under the federal 
Constitution is quite significant.  State constitutional universalists emphasize that the 
space is not so great that state constitutions can sensibly be read in isolation from the 
federal Constitution, but their theories depend on at least enough sub-national 
constitutional space for state judges to develop alternative ways of thinking about 
national constitutional problems and to express alternative constitutional values.  Yet 
the special laws jurisprudence, by mimicking federal law from an unrelated category 
of equal protection, collapses this space into meaninglessness.  The people attempted 
to develop alternatives to permissive federal judicial review, but there was no space 
for that in the minds of state judges.  The people attempted to express alternative 
constitutional values about acceptable levels of economic control over government, 
but there was no space for that either.  The result is a bland conformity that belies the 
universalists’ description of a national discourse.  One voice, the federal voice, has 
shouted over any attempt at divergence.226 
Similarly, the pragmatists, although comfortable with strained readings of 
constitutional text in the service of good policy, can neither defend nor explain the 
state courts’ refusal to oppose bad public policy even when offered a sound textual 
basis for doing so.  The pragmatists’ emphasis on intra- and inter-governmental 
cooperation succeeds admirably in many circumstances.  But cooperation, especially 
for pragmatists, is only an instrumental good valuable for obtaining effective and 
democratic governance.  The special laws jurisprudence reveals how state 
constitutions are frequently written not to facilitate cooperative government but to 
inhibit it.  Just as single-subject bills, part-time legislatures, and balanced-budget 
amendments are state constitutional attempts to block cooperative and efficient 
government, so the prohibitions on special laws are meant to interfere with 
legislative prerogative.  So long as high court judges view their role pragmatically as 
to assist the legislature by providing legal cover for its policy ambitions, the courts 
lack fidelity to the constitutions that establish them. 
What then is left for state constitutional theory?  First, the theories described 
above continue to be persuasive in many applications of state constitutional law, 
particularly in areas of individual rights.  But future state constitutionalists must 
                                                            
 225 See G. Alan Tarr, Explaining Sub-national Constitutional Space, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1133, 1135 (2011). 
 226 Ironically, Robert Cover himself predicted that formal legal systems tend to crowd out 
their competitors in a “jurispathic” process that stifles dissenting visions of law and justice. 
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1983).  Here, federal 
jurisprudence has jurispathically ended the opportunity for states to enforce restraints on 
economic domination of the political process. 
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account for circumstances where federal law has so overwhelmed state autonomy 
that even formal state constitutional change as a result of repeated popular 
movements cannot carve out enough sub-national constitutional space to take effect.  
This occurs despite more-than-ample space in the formal federal Constitution for the 
state innovations at issue.  When federal law swamps state constitutions in this way, 
the state constitutions are: (1) no longer binding positive law; (2) no longer sites of 
contestation for national constitutional values; and (3) no longer effective frames of 
government capable of empowering or restraining the people’s agents toward wise 
public policy.  A complete state constitutional theory must account for and 
incorporate these surprising effects. 
Constitutional positivists are well aware of how frequently state courts deviate 
from an autonomous interpretation of constitutional text.  The challenge for them is 
not that courts do this from time to time, because the positivists simply argue that 
those opinions are wrongly decided and that courts should attempt text-based 
interpretation.  But in the context of special laws prohibitions, the very best 
rationales for textual interpretation, offered by the most persuasive positivists and 
supported by the most compelling fit to these particular constitutional texts, still 
have made no influence on judicial practice.  These theorists must eventually 
confront the likelihood that no argument, however brilliant, and no text, however 
explicit, will convince state judges to interpret their state constitutional text even 
where theory most strongly suggests that they should.  Positivists should stop 
developing ever-more elegant arguments for textual interpretation.  Instead, they 
should begin to study which legal process does create texts uniformly recognized as 
constitutional law by state high courts, if any. In particular, positivists should seek to 
explain why the constitutional amendment and revision process that led to 
prohibitions on special laws, itself a process explicitly described in constitutional 
text, failed to produce texts recognized as binding law by the judges who interpret 
those constitutions.  It might be that as a descriptive matter, the only positive texts 
that consistently win recognition from state constitutional courts as legitimate 
explications of constitutional principle are federal Supreme Court opinions.  In any 
event, positivists should worry about this question. 
Constitutional universalists should understand that the special laws jurisprudence 
represents the evaporation of subnational constitutional space to contest national 
values.  This poses no problem if the people of the states genuinely prefer federal 
policy; the state-federal discourse need not always be one of conflict and resistance.  
But the key to the universalists’ description of federalism as a principal-agent 
relationship where the people have two agents competing to offer the best policy is 
that the people are the principal.  If state judges simply refuse to offer an alternative 
to federal jurisprudence, no matter how clearly the people insist upon it, then the 
principal has lost the benefit of competitive agents.  Universalists should examine 
more closely the mechanics of how they expect ordinary citizens to express and 
effectuate their shifting allegiances between state and federal governments.  The 
power of the universalists’ benevolent vision of state-federal discourse is that it 
ultimately serves republican ends through the promotion of public reasoning and 
explicit articulation of otherwise unspoken principles. Universalists must consider 
not merely whether such a discourse exists, but whether structural obstacles prevent 
citizens from expressing their preference among the competing constitutional 
visions. 
Finally, constitutional pragmatists should take the example of special laws 
prohibitions as a reminder of how frequently state constitutions are intended to 
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impede, rather than to enhance, state governance.  This feature conflicts so strongly 
with state judges’ perceived role as expediters of efficient state policy that they will 
resist even direct constitutional commands to exercise non-deferential judicial 
review.  The judges’ willingness to stretch their jurisprudence so far beyond the text 
to benefit the legislature only appears democratic.  The people themselves are left in 
the cold.  Perhaps the pragmatists prefer good policy over democratic accountability, 
but if so, they should explain why.  More importantly, the pragmatists should 
identify how they recognize “good” policy if the constitutional polity disagrees (and 
has expressed that disagreement in the constitutional text). 
The theoretical prescriptions I offer here simply scratch the surface of how 
scholars should respond to the problem I have identified in this Article.  But the 
problem of why state courts do not give effect to their constitutional prohibitions on 
special laws is both lasting and important. Scholars hoping to understand how and 
why state constitutions work must acknowledge the challenge this jurisprudence 
poses.  Only then can state constitutionalism fulfill its potential as a democratic 
institution. 
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